



The History of Politics in Angola: From Nationalism to the Totalitarian Single-Party System

A História da Política de Angola: Do Nacionalismo ao Totalitário Sistema de Partido Único

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Palavras-chave:

Nacionalismo; Sistema de partido Único; Política; Socialismo; Angola; África.

RESUMO

As instabilidades políticas, econômicas e sociais dos países africanos têm sido vistas como um dos maiores desafios a serem superados nos dias atuais. Hoje, a falta de liberdade econômica e social é o grande problema que faz com que o fraco esforço dos políticos africanos em consolidar os sistemas políticos e econômicos em permanente crise, seja ainda mais vulnerável. Tentamos entender as razões dos crescentes níveis de suborno das instituições públicas e privadas, além do déficit de uma ética política e outros fatores corrosivos das nações africanas que o tornam um continente com alto nível de vulnerabilidade. Assim, nos encarregamos de esboçar uma linha histórica do pensamento político de um dos países mais promissores do continente africano: a Angola. Isto é possível por meio do uso de fontes históricas que encadeiam os principais acontecimentos políticos da história de Angola que levaram à independência e que obtiveram sucesso. Conclui-se que a intervenção estatal baseada em idéias socialistas / comunistas tem sido, como teoricamente comprovado pela Escola Austríaca, prejudicial ao desenvolvimento sócio-econômico do país africano e sugere-se uma revisão para que tal intervenção seja finalizada em um futuro artigo.

Keywords:

Nationalism; One-party System; Politics; Socialism; Angola; Africa.

ABSTRACT

The political, economic and social instabilities of the African countries have been seen as one of the biggest challenges to be overcome in the current days. Today, the lack of economic and social freedom is the great problem that makes the weak effort of the African politicians on consolidating the political and economic systems in permanent crisis, even more vulnerable. We attempt to understand the reasons of the increasing levels of bribery of the public and private institutions besides the deficit of a political ethics and other corrosive factors of the African nations that make it a continent with a high level of vulnerability. So, we task ourselves to draft a historic line of the political thought of one of the most promising countries of the African continent: Angola. This is achieved through the use of historic sources that chain the main political events of the history of Angola that led to the independence and that succeeded. It is concluded that the state intervention based on ideas socialist / communist ideas has been, as theoretically proved by the Austrian School, harmful to the socio-economic development of the African country and it is suggested a review to such intervention to be completed in a future paper.

Palabras clave:

Nacionalismo; Sistema de Partido Único; Política; Socialismo; Angola; África.

RESUMEN

Las inestabilidades políticas, económicas y sociales de los países africanos han sido vistas como uno de los mayores desafíos a ser superados en los días actuales. Hoy, la falta de libertad económica y social es el gran problema que hace que el débil esfuerzo de los políticos africanos en consolidar los sistemas políticos y económicos en permanente crisis, sea aún más vulnerable. Intentamos entender las razones de los crecientes niveles de soborno de las instituciones públicas y privadas, además del déficit de una ética política y otros factores corrosivos de las naciones africanas que lo convierten en un continente con alto nivel de vulnerabilidad. Así, nos encargamos de esbozar una línea histórica del pensamiento político de uno de los países más prometedores del continente africano: Angola. Esto es posible por medio del uso de fuentes históricas que encadenan los principales acontecimientos políticos de la historia de Angola que llevaron a la independencia y que obtuvieron éxito. Se concluye que la intervención estatal basada en ideas socialistas o comunistas ha sido, como teóricamente comprobado por la Escuela Austríaca, perjudicial para el desarrollo socioeconómico del país africano y se sugiere una revisión para que tal intervención sea finalizada en un futuro artículo.

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INTRODUCTION

Angola is a country that has Portuguese as its official language. It is located in the South of the African continent. It shares the North border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo, the South border with Namibia, the West one with the Atlantic Ocean and the East border with Zambia. The history of the political thought of Angola talks about its people, outlines and deployments. It is, actually, necessary to delineate them since the emergence of Angolan nationalist movements, which date back to the 1950s and 1960s. Its purpose was the claim for the unit and exaltation of the culture, African values and the constitution of a continent guided by the Africans, giving due value to the local ethnic groups; a nation that, later, would give place to the called pan-Africanism. In spite of the difficulties, these movements developed a project by propagating the message and the desire for Africa by the Africans. In the words of the Africanist journalist and historian Basil Davidson:

The new nationalists of the 1950s ended up hugging the nationalism as the only possible escape to the colonial sovereignty. Making effort to transform colonial territories into national territories, they ended up considering that the wealth of African ethnic cultures was at the same time disturbing and hard to incorporate in their schemes. They came to fall again in the colonial mentality that considered this wealth as tribalism and, as such, retrograde. ([DAVIDSON, 2000, p.103](#))

The emergence of nationalist movements helped leaders to stand out. They performed a significant role for the implementation of the communism disguised of nationalism. Kwame Nkrumah¹ had a role of extreme importance in the fight and defense of the nationalist communism, and he was a one-party system member. For Kwame Nkrumah, nationalism was the driving force whose doctrine should be based on the awareness of the philosophy of the African revolution ([NKRUMAH, 1977^a](#)).

Moreover, the African politician defined the nationalism in three political components of the freedom movements: the nationalism, the pan-Africanism and the socialism. The idea was the promotion of the concept of the African Personality². Another important fact was the awakening of

¹ Ganesh Leader, one of the main articulators of pan-Africanism.

² The concept of African Personality was coined by Caribbean intellectual Edwuard Blyden, one of the main thinkers of the pan-Africanism. Blyden argued for equality between blacks, because both are part of the same personality, what he calls African Personality. Blyden grounds that the idea of race was consolidated in the culture of his people. For him, the African Personality would be the viable path of the blacks for universal civilization. Roughly, it would be necessary to establish a project to "africanize" the Africa. Blyden understood that this project of "africanization" would be a necessary step to the formation of a single nation in Sub-Saharan West Africa. For more detailed information about the pan-africanism and the concept of African Personality, read, among others: [Devés-Váldez \(2008\)](#), [Clarke \(1988\)](#).

African awareness about the colonial situation and the fight for political and social freedom besides the aspiration of the conquest of the status of the black people in the world face the European domain.

This paper aims to draft a historic journey of the Angolan political thought through the use of historic sources that chained the main political events of the history of Angola that led to the independence from Portugal and that succeeded until the current days. The paper is organized in three big sections that address, in a broad way, the different periods of the Angolan history. The first part discusses the international environment in the middle of the 20th century and its consequences to the African countries; soon after the political movements that led Angola from nationalism to the one-party system are more specifically addressed. The last historical part approaches the attempt of democratization of the country through the establishment of the elections in the beginning of the 1990s and its consequences. Lastly, final considerations are made and paths for future researches are suggested.

1 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The emergence of the Cold War in the Sub-Saharan Africa awaked to the nationalists politicians the frame of the delimitation of new political horizons in the emerging countries. For these new emerging nations to be formed, it was necessary the choice of ideologies tied to dominant political systems in the international sphere. The choice was between the American liberal democracy and the communism from the Soviet Union. It is not hard to note that the African leaders aligned to the communism with the speech of war and fight to the imperialist liberal democracy ([NKRUMAH, 1977^b](#)).

The American policy, which was adopted in the 1960s, aimed the support to the independence of the new African States through the help on its economic development without defining political conditions. In the hope that the African States progressively recognize the advantages of the liberal democracy and the risks to establish relationships with the communist world. The concern of the United States, regarding to the African nations, was to exercise greater influence against the propagation of the communism in the context of the crib continent ([SÁ, 2011^a](#)).

At the other end, the Soviet Union took advantage of the internationalization process of the African countries to expand its communist influence in the form of help with weapons of war, aiming to free the new countries from American imperialism. This factor supported the base of the Marxist-Leninist pillars in the African context ([SÁ, 2011^b](#)).

3 FROM PLURAL NATIONALISM TO THE TOTALITARIAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

On behalf of the fight against the Portuguese colonialism, the Angolan nationalist built a feeling of the national unit that aimed to drop the colonists and ascend to the power, with the purpose of promoting a welfare state to the Angolan people.

Inspired by radical figures from black activism, the Pan-Africanist movement dominated the whole period between wars. At this time, several movements of African emancipation emerged. However, the most important and that one that, indeed, was more affirmed as a cultural movement of elevation of the African awareness was, with no doubt, the Blackness, which appears in the 1930s, led by the Senegalese Leópolo Sénghor and the Antilian Aimé Césaire ([PAIM, 2014](#)).

The messianism of Kwame Nkrumah elevated him in the front-line as an African icon of the fight against colonial oppression, idealizing the utopia of States genuinely African resulting from postcolonial period ([NKRUMAH, 1977^c](#)).

The African nationalist process was supported under the aegis of European Marxist Africanists, namely, Russians, and not only with the excuse to introduce ideological models in Africa that would connect with the way the traditional African man is. It consisted in placing himself in a feudal system sharing values and traditions. “This revolutionary spirit soon gained space and spread for all Africa finding fertile ground to develop itself” ([MATUMONA, 2004^a, p.51-53](#)). This phenomenon matched with several endogenous factors: the fight for power, the weak preparation of the African elite, the rampant bribery. They contributed to the accelerated process of African independences, whose Afrocentric speech and the conjuncture of the problematic of the Cold War assumed positions of progressive nature with the emergence of imported Soviet models permeated by a Leninist socialism. That was on the basis that most of the African countries have built up their systems of political power, in a way of one-party systems, whose power is in the centralist and dictatorial pedestal ([MATUMONA, 2004^b](#)).

3.1 The historic journey of the independentist movements in Angola

The nationalist surge, in its embryonic stage, emerged in the North of the country with the Union of the Populations of the North of Angola ([MATUMONA, 2004^c](#)). Later, other movements appeared and their revolutionary seed quickly spread throughout the national territory. It brought

up an existing sense of outrage among the Angolan pro-independence people, and had the oppression and humiliation in the face of colonial domain as a consequence.

The revolutionary fight was restricted to two essential paradigms: if, by one side, there were pro-independence movements that defended a fight with a level of violent conflict against the colonialism, by the other side, there were those ones who defended collaborationist ideas and policies. They were based on values that pointed to a close cooperation with the Portuguese culture whose influence had left traces in the Angolan society and culture. It was in this mixture of feelings that the freedom movements were borne and it brought up an unbridled conflict with which was proclaimed the independence of the country that put such movements in a close economic dependency on other countries. The main ones would be the "Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, founded in 1956, the Frente Nacional de Libertação do Leste, in 1954, and the União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola, in 1960³" All these movements, in a first stage, were linked and identified with ethnic-regional groups" ([HODGES, 2002, p. 24-25](#)).

The principles that joined the common and shared feeling of a fight against the colonialism soon was reduced to the personal ambitions and mischaracterized what could be called of "national project" ignoring the true reason for the fight of Angolans from Cabinda to Cunene⁴". Moreover, the three main nationalist movements (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) have never established an united front against the Portuguese people. So, that made difficult the cohesion between them, once their structures were dominated by ethnic elites that promoted regional and ethnocentric point of views.

3.2 The turbulent period of the independence face to the pacification of the angolans

The Alvor Agreements⁵, signed in Algarve, Portugal, in 1975, would have been a historical landmark to the Angolans if, MPLA (*Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola*) had

³ Henceforth, we will only use acronyms to refer to these movements: MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), FNLL (National Front for the Liberation of the East) e UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola).

⁴ Cabinda is an enclave that does not geographically belong to the Angolan territory. Cabinda was ceded to Portugal in the division of the African territory by colonizing countries at the Berlin Conference, in 1885. For more details, see <http://www.cabinda.org/historia.htm>. To refer to the totaling to the Angolan territory, the Angolan use expression from "Cabinda to Cunene", being Cabinda the Northernmost province of Angola and Cunene the Southernmost province, this way corresponding to the total of the Angolan territory from North to South.

⁵ The Alvor Agreement is a historical event among Portugal, *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), joined in Alvor, at Algarve, from January 10 to 15, 1975. They discussed and executed the access of Angola to independence, and agreed with the following aspects: recognition, by Portugal, of the three nationalist movements as the only legitimate representatives of the Angolan people; confirmation of the territorial unit of Angola; a general ceasefire; establishment of transition government, headed by a "presidential college" composed by three members (one of each movement), and with 12 ministries distributed equitably between the freedom movements and Portugal; the transfer of powers from Portugal to the agencies of Angolan sovereignty until the independence date (i.e., to the High Commissioner and to the transition government); the integration of the forces of the different movements, in parity with Portuguese forces, in the mixed military forces, composed by 8 thousand fighters of each movement and by 28 thousand from

really encompassed the other two nationalist movements, FNLA (*National Front for the Liberation of Angola*) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), in the sharing of the power. Such fact did not happen due to the ambition of the leadership of MPLA, that proclaimed the independence of Angola at 00h00 a.m. on November 11, 1975, at candlelight, and without being aware of the existence of the other two movements.

Led by Antônio Agostinho Neto⁶ and other Angolan nationalist intellectuals, like Viriato da Cruz, Lúcio Lara, Mário Pinto de Andrade and Daniel Chipenda ([CHIWALE, 2008, p.53](#)), “the MPLA had just raised the flag of freedom and proclaimed its political ideas, but it was completely neglecting the elites of other ethnic-regional groups of Angola, which, similarly to MPLA, took part in the freedom fight” ([SAVIMBI, 1977](#)). This position would be a demonstration that MPLA, in spite of having its roots among the intellectuals of the North of Angola, considered to be the unique and legitimate representative of the Angolans.

However, this period was marked with the rupture and great political turbulence in the search of an agreement among the several forces in the sharing of the power. The nationalist movements soon have proved to be unable to dialog and work together. So, in the lack of broad and consensual program, a desperate race of national and international affirmation started; which was converted in the searching of supports and future strategic alliances to the control of the natural resources. About this concern, professors Vidal and Andrade say that:

It is equally significant that the internal players have sought to maintain connections between the household policy and the international policy, in a way to best serve to their own goals. The external dimension is important, but in no single way regarding to Angola ([VIDAL; ANDRADE, 2005^a, p.24](#)).

With the unilateral statement of the independence of Angola, MPLA had its prestige recognized and reinforced across the borders. Brazil was the first country to recognize as legitimate the communist government of MPLA ([SILVA, 2016, p.483-484](#)). With the Cold War, the MPLA converted into an avant-garde party and “adopted an ideological matrix on the Marxist-Leninist line ([VIDAL, 2016, p.819](#))”, and the one-party was wrapped in the pillars of the Labor Party. It extended its support bases in cities, towns and villages, whose committees served as a lever in the continuity of its political strategy of a mass movement.

Portuguese forces; the right of all individuals born in Angola to citizenship; the permanence of a Portuguese military contingent until February 1976; the independence date set for November 11, 1975.

⁶ President of MPLA and first President of People's Republic of Angola. His importance is so great that he is listed as one of the heroes Angola Republic.

3.3 The rise to power

When the independence of the People's Republic of Angola was declared, the MPLA adopted the strategy of socialist State of single-party, whose primacy in the structure of government was consecrated in the I Constitution post-independence, by the Central Committee of the Party ratified in 1976 ([WRIGHT, 2001^a](#)).

Although it has been established in power and in the State apparatus, the MPLA failed to stabilize the situation of the country as predicted. The instability produced an environment of permanent uncertainty, breaking all the expectations of a better future of the recent-independent country.

Aiming to eliminate the opponents, a repression began with summary executions, arbitrary arrests, practices of torture. The mass organizations of the Party were especially stroked, besides the Armed Forces, the Public Management, the ostensible police and the public safety police, the ministries, the students and the intellectuals. It is deployed a police force that develops a violent campaign of terror in the media, all controlled by the system. A culture of fear was infiltrated, and random information that strikes directly the social solidarities and left one of the heaviest inheritances in the contemporary history of Angola. From this moment, Angola enters in a spiral of fear and violence, with the reinforced use of the secret police, whose purpose was to suppress by aspiration of dissent or alternative to the system in force. It is in this context that a famous Angolan popular saying came up: *Xé kandengue não fala política* [*Xé kandengue does not talk about politics*] ([ALBUQUERQUE, 2002](#)).

3.4 The one-party system

In the face of a context of crisis, it was noted the evolution from the MPLA to the MPLA-Labor Party. It was consecrated in the I Party Conference, which was carried out in December of 1977. It represents an effort of institutionalization of the system of the MPLA power, that differentiating from its environment, sought its affirmation and consolidation as a State power.

The great signal of this effort of institutionalization of the elitist and ruling hegemony is, indeed, marked with the concept of avant-garde party. This differs from the more usual notion of the mass party when implying, in the theoretical plan, the regency of an elite in favor of the proletariat and in a greater level of control of that one over the State apparatus. The

transformation into the MPLA-PT (*Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Party of Labour*) shows how the feasibility of the system of power would require its recomposition, its reconfiguration.

While an avant-garde party, MPLA-PT would work according to the principle of the democratic centralism⁷. The purpose was to create a socialist State and transform the society; creating political and administrative structures that allow to the Party to control almost all society levels. Likewise, it was required a need of ideological unit in the Party for the revolutionary democratic dictatorship to be implemented.

MPLA-PT is, indeed, an elite organization, whose project on society, economy and State had hegemonic ambitions. In a speech pronounced in 1978, in Cabinda, Agostinho Neto clearly stated below about the line of economic development adopted by the I Conference of MPLA-PT:

It is necessary that the determinations, the decisions are from Party bodies. It is the Party that guides. The Party gives guidelines, The Party gives those necessary instructions for the realization in the material plan that we hope for satisfaction of all People. Not only from militants of the Party, but all People. The Party works to the People and not only to its militants. The militants are the agents of the People. They are agents of the working class. (...) At this moment, the Popular Power is not yet organized and we trust all function of democratization, of socialization of our Country to an organism of the Party, to the Central Committee of MPLA. It is the Central Committee of MPLA who should boost the organization of the Popular Power for the great decisions, the most important ones in our Country, that really needs to be taken by the working classes. ([MPLA-PT, 1978^a, p. 20-26](#))

Aiming to transmit the ideal of an united nation, the system sought to transmit an image of conciliation with other resistance groups, not being favorable to its government style, since the independence proclamation, made in a way which is not either democratic or transparent. In this same speech, made only one year after the supposed attempt of a coup by Nito Alves⁸, Agostinho Neto referring to the East Revolt and to the Active Revolt, states:

In our country, we had other contradictions with elements that, for example, there are sects against the management of MPLA in 1974. It means that was called as an Active Revolt or

⁷ The principle of the centralism democratic refers to the practice of the decisions based on open discussions in the Party, but whose implementation is performed exclusively by ruling elite.

⁸ Nito Alves was a militant of MPLA and, in 1977, ([MPLA, 1977](#)) led an attempted of coup d'etat against the system and the President Agostinho Neto. This coup failed and he was killed, even as many of their followers, but also government members. About this matter, there are many controversy. Some people states that the coup has been thought up by Agostinho Neto, as a way to incriminate and get rid of Nito, because he was its direct opponent in the party. ([BOTELHO, 2000](#); [FAUVET, 1979](#); [FRANCISCO, 2007](#); [TONET, 2001](#)).

an East Revolt . (...) the political management of our Party decided to free, restore to the freedom those that were under the hands and control of justice. They will be set free, will work and contribute as surely is their wish to rebuild our country. On the other side, there are those who collaborate with puppets of FNLA, of FLEC⁹ (....). I cannot fail to mention that, to reach this point, it was necessary to take very hard positions. It was necessary to engage combats, that were violent sometimes, against those who wanted to reduce the value, the prestige of the Angola's People and its legitimate representatives who are the management of MPLA-Labor Party and that are the Government of Republic of Angola. (...) We will always take a tough attitude towards those who want to disturb the order, and the peace of our territory. ([MPLA-PT, 1978^b, p. 20-26](#))

The disciplinary repression and surveillance, although being central parts in the operation of the power, were not the only strategies used. Actually, while techniques of reduction and domestication of the complexity of its environment of existence, the tensions raised by them could give reasons for new turbulences and new moments of internal countercharges. In other words, the operations started by power, based on violent disciplinary repressions, given the emergence of the dissent and the internal contradictions, that could easily reproduce the tensions that sought to eliminate. Other strategies had to be developed and these were based on the integration in the structures of the Party and in the power of speeches potentially defendants and rivals and of elements from several origins. This way of dominated origin allowed to answer two problems of the system of power. On one side, the domestication of the complexity and the instability and the strengthening of its foundations crossed by tectonic faults already identified, and, on the other side, built a base of pluriethnic legitimacy that could be claimed as universal and not as regional/ethnic.

4 FROM THE BICESS AGREEMENTS TO THE ELECTIONS OF 1992

Despite the fact they could install an one-party system, the hegemony of MPLA continued to be threatened by its more direct rival, UNITA, which always opposed to the government of MPLA. The duration of this conflict was possible, in part, due to the involvement and support of USSR and USA¹⁰.

⁹ Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda

¹⁰ According to Pezarat, the superpowers continued to prefer not engage too visibly, opting for wars by delegation and thus causing, in part, the conflict East-West to get confused, either with the component of the regional conflict, as with the component of the civil conflict. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact continued to openly support MPLA and to bear with great part of the expenses of the Cuban effort, while the United States, despite the 'Clark Amendment', continues to provide its support, now exclusively in benefit of UNITA. This support was intensified in the 1980's, after the rise of Ronald Reagan (...), who includes UNITA and Jonas Savimbi in that he called 'fighters of freedom'. ([1996, p. 43](#))

Because of Agostinho Neto's death, in 1979, and the rise of José Eduardo dos Santos¹¹ to the power, the situation came to a kind of deadlock: the UNITA could not kick out the MPLA from the cities, such as this last could not dominate the first. Other disengagements succeeded with the drastic changes that took place at the international level from the end of the 1980s. It is certain that the reforms of Gorbachev, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communism in the Eastern Europe produced irreversible effects on the relationship of the international community to the Angolan conflict ([MESSIANT, 1994, p.18](#)).

With the collapse of the communism and evident fall of the socialist block, MPLA started to produce the realignment of its economic policy ([CHABAL; DALOZ, 1999](#)). In 1990, an action with mediation of UN, Portugal, USSR and USA, initiate a peace process leading to Bicesse. During the negotiations, the UNITA recognizes the legitimacy of the MPLA government as a transition government and the MPLA was required to abandon the Marxism-Leninism and open the multi-party system¹².

The Bicesse Agreements were guided by several principles that already had been established by Alvor. Such as Alvor, Bicesse established the ceasefire and a transition period that would culminate in the holding of multi-party elections.

With the Bicesse Agreements, signed on May 31, 1991, both parts reached an agreement about a new Constitution, the joint of the two military forces in a national Army and about the calendar of the future multi-party elections. As they were included in the Agreements, the fundamental principles for establishment of peace in Angola would refer explicitly to the recognition by UNITA of the Angolan State, the President José Eduardo dos Santos and the Angolan Government, until general elections were held¹³.

¹¹ José Eduardo dos Santos ([2006](#)) was, at that time, Minister of Planning, i.e, holder of one of the most important ministries. He was rapidly selected by Central Committee to take the place of Neto. In the power, he can get greater support of Cuba and with its help, weaken the South African presence in the south of the country. Dos Santos was perpetuated in the power until 2017, when pressured by the leadership of the party decided not to run for elections, having indicated another candidate from his party.

¹² In June of this year, in meeting of its Central Committee, the leading summit of MPLA formalizes the abandon of single-party system and the acceptance of the political competition between parties. In December, the III Party Conference decides by abandon of the Marxism-Leninism and the reference of LP in its name.

¹³ The Protocol of Estoril establishes that elections will be by direct and secret suffrage, through a majority system, with the resource of a second suffrage, if necessary. To the National Assembly, it will be by direct and secret suffrage, through a proportional system of representation at national level. All political parties and stakeholders will have the opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process on equal terms, regardless of their political positions. The full freedom of expression and association, and the access to the media will be ensured». Bicesse predicted that, if none of the candidates to the presidential elections obtained 50% of the votes, would have a second suffrage. This was also constitutionally consecrated (Law No. 23 from 1992, which approves the Law of Constitutional Review ([ANGOLA, 1992](#))), in the Article 57. The President of the Republic is elected by absolute majority of the validly cast votes. If none candidate obtain such votes, there is a second suffrage, in which only can run the two candidates who have obtained the biggest number of votes in the first election and have not given up. The process of maintenance of peace and political and military integration and carried out by a Joint Political and Military Committee (CCPM), composed by members of MPLA, UNITA, USA, USSR and Portugal and supported by mission of observation from UN (UNAVEM II). There were created, also, a Mixed Verification and Inspection Committee (CMVF) to monitor the ceasefire, and the *Comissão Conjunta para a* Joint Committee for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA).

In the midst of mistrust, Jonas Savimbi¹⁴, accepted to go to the ballot boxes and on September 29 and 30, 1992, the first elections were held in Angola after the proclamation of the republic, in 1975. After the release of the first results, it was quickly confirmed the victory of José Eduardo Dos Santos and his Party, MPLA ([VIDAL; ANDRADE, 2005^b](#)).

The elections of 1992 had confirmed the poor maturity of the Angolan political players to implement in the country a stable, broad and consensual political project. In this context, the country expected from their leaders, a political coherence in the commitments in their constituency. And, at the same time, give to the Angolan people and to the international community guarantees in the frame of the Protocol of Bicesse, according to what was possible to ensure the transparency after scrutinized the ballot boxes regarding to the counting of the votes. Contrary to such expectations, the country would regress and return to the war and to the past when bringing to the memory the Alvor model (1975) alike, MPLA had not used democratic methods in the proclamation of the independence. With respect to the Bicesse process (1992), he fell apart with the restart of the war in the main cities of the country, translating in a real defeat at the political and social level. The only hope of the Angolan was to wait for new negotiations between UNITA and MPLA to be definitely able to save the process ([UNITA, s/db](#)).

With the enlargement of the conflict, the International Community and the United Nations Security Council, recognized and legitimate the Luanda system with the right to defend against all advances of UNITA, adopting, this way, the Resolution 864, and considering UNITA "a threat to the international peace and the safety" ([WRIGHT, 2001^b, p.332](#)).

With the advance of UNITA in the process of civil war, a consequence of dissatisfaction with the electoral result, MPLA was entitled to increase the Cuban presence in Angola, under the excuse to protect the oil exploration of Cabinda ([MONTEIRO, 2003, p.10](#)). Aware of the deterioration of the economic and social situation and the impossibility of economic reconstruction, the MPLA system suffered the advances of its main rival: UNITA reappears militarily in the South and accuses the MPLA of being imprisoned in the hands of foreigners, claiming that MPLA government was dominated by the fair-skinned people. This conflict between UNITA and MPLA only ended in 2002, after the death of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, by forces Angolan Army government ([UNITA, s/da](#)). Table 1 presents a summary of the events mentioned.

¹⁴ Leader founder of UNITA and main opponent of the MPLA government since 1975, when occurred the proclamation of the independence of Angola by the leader of MPLA, António Agostinho Neto.

Table 1: Timeline of the event described in the text

Date	Event
1950-1960	The Cold War and the Consequences for Sub-Saharan Africa
1950-1960	Foundation of the Main Freedom Movements of Angola (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA)
1975	Angola becomes independent from Portugal
1975	Beginning of the civil war led by UNITA and FNLA due to the non-recognition of the MPLA government
1977	Official institution of MPLA-LP as one-party
1991	Bicesse Agreements (ceasefire), negotiations between the UNITA and the MPLA for the establishment of peace in Angola.
1992	First elections after independence in 1975
2002	Death of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA; It is signed the Peace Treaty with the remaining of the members of UNITA.

Source: Elaborated by the author

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the 1990`s, with the fall of the East European Block and the crash of its political and economic model, the Angola government was forced to change its policy. It was pressured by UN and as part of the agreement to get help, started the "liberalization process"¹⁵ and structural readjustment, with the promise of balance of the internal and external accounting and the reduction of the public sector (MPLA, 1990, p. 8-9). The privatization did not represent no more than the permission to the members of the government elite dominate the new private business sector of the future "market economy" (DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, [1989a](#); [1989b](#))¹⁶.

What followed was not a transition to a liberal market economy as expected, but an adaptation of the modern property system effectively existing, which removed the formal garbs of one-party Socialism to take on the garbs of the liberal market economy. However, keeping its original background logic, the use of the State apparatus for the private benefit and appropriation

¹⁵ In the Angolan context, the liberalization would refer to the opening of market for the main members of the ruling elite to exercise monopoly of the state-owned companies and create "private" incentives with money from public treasury. In other words, the main investors would be the own members of the government.

¹⁶ In July 15, 1989, several laws were approved to restructure the state economic sector and modify the commercial activity which approves the concession of commercial establishments belonging to the State to other economic agents. Emphasizing the ineffectiveness of SEF, especially regarding to the most "controversial" measures.

of the public good by the ruling elites, dependents and loyal to the party in the power, ensuring the hegemonic maintenance of the power, consecrating the old ambitions to become in a State bourgeoisie, as had been accused by the other movements decades ago. It is appropriate we consult Hayek's studies aiming to evidence that the system implemented in Angola could not be called free market because it was only a feat of the socialist party that rules the country. Let's see what Hayek says:

The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labours of society for a definite social goal. [...] The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ between themselves in the nature of the goal towards which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end, and in refusing to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism. The "social goal", or "common purpose", for which society is to be organized, is usually vaguely described as the "common good", or the "general welfare", or the "general interest".
([HAYEK, 1944, p. 59-60](#))

In other words, Angola has never experienced a true market freedom, what happened was only a state intervention disguised as free market. Today, the lack of economic and social freedom is the great problem, and it becomes more vulnerable the weak Angolan effort in the search for consolidation of the economic systems that are in the situation of permanent crisis by a lack of transparency of the publication of its accounting. For such thing, it is necessary to concentrate efforts to become effective the essential sectors of the public and private African life. The democratization and the formation of a constructive public opinion of the African civil society, the liberalization of the governments, the eradication of the endemic armed conflicts, the fight against the phenomenon the rampant bribery, the obsolete educational system and the lack of staff, and fight to the illiteracy.

The levels of deep poverty are reflected in the cultural, scientific and technological hold back, and this part of the planet faces, nowadays, a crisis that makes difficult, in a great measure, its social stabilization. If the socialism brought some equality, this is the equality of the poverty between all citizens non-participants of the clergy that rules the country.

The planned economy of Angola is a proof that the equality evoked by socialism is an utopia. With no competition and market opening, the Angolans became hostages of a State, where

the wealth is shared with the elite that rules the country. Lastly, it should be emphasized that it is necessary to make a criticism to the interventionism based on the Austrian paradigm ([MISES, 2018](#)). However, as this is an introductory paper about the history and consequences of Angola's political thinking, we will reserve it for a future production.

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