Introduction
How does a change in a rule affect society? In the energy sector, it allowed more than 5.7 million households, in just over ten years, to install photovoltaic panels to generate their own power (Aneel, 2026a).
A superficial analysis might hold that this is the result of consumer sovereignty in the face of monopolies created by the State. In the light of the Austrian School, however, the outcome turns out to be nothing more than the consequence of a chain of interventionism that led consumers to flee a monopolistic model in which the tariff carries the costs of distortions created by the State (da Silva, 2024a).
Understanding the nature of the events responsible for a given effect on society requires careful analysis. Frederic Bastiat (1850/2010) demonstrated this principle very well in the book That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Not Seen. The broken window may seem a good motive for stimulating the economy; however, it only impoverishes the citizen.
Analyzing large markets, such as the Brazilian electricity system, requires an effort that goes beyond what “is not seen”. The current scenario, the result of numerous interventions imposed over the years, generates a complex web of rules that defines the behavior of citizens in society.
The aim of this article is to analyze the policy promoting distributed micro and minigeneration (DG) in Brazil from the Austrian perspective and to quantify its impacts. To this end, the paper (i) systematizes the contributions of Mises, Ikeda, Bradley and Barbieri to the theory of interventionism; (ii) proposes a method to identify the causal chain and the direction of interventions; (iii) characterizes and quantifies the main interventions that burden electricity consumers; and (iv) applies the method to the DG policy, discussing the future directions of sector policy.
Establishing, for a specific case, the damage caused by State control of markets is relevant to inform the direction of new policies. Moving toward an environment of free enterprise is not a consensus among decision-makers, and the recurring justifications are that consumers may be exploited by businesspeople or be exposed to high electricity prices. The solutions adopted insist on adding new layers of intervention to the market in an attempt to correct the errors of past interventions.
The existence of an end to interventionism, a thesis defended by Mises (2010a), is also explored in this article, which identifies the exhaustion of the State’s capacity to sustain public policies through the tariffs paid by consumers, requiring alternatives for the State’s withdrawal from the Brazilian electricity market.
The contribution of the article is twofold. On the theoretical level, it translates the Austrian theory of interventionism into an operational criterion for classifying sector policies. On the applied level, it offers an estimate of the cost of interventions in the BES and shows that the success of DG depends both on the explicit subsidy of the net-metering system and on the tariff increase caused by earlier interventions.
Besides this introduction, the article is organized into four sections and the concluding remarks. Section 1 presents the theoretical framework; section 2, the method of analysis; section 3 characterizes the BES and its main interventions; and section 4 applies the method to the DG promotion policy.
1. Theoretical framework: interventionism in the Austrian School
Austrian School authors discuss the organization of markets in society in three forms: free enterprise, the provider State (for which socialism served as the reference) and the mixed economy (which blends State control with private resources). In practice, an alternation among the three arrangements can be observed, but only free enterprise provides long-term stability. For Mises (2010a), both the mixed economy and the provider State lead to the same result: impoverishment of the population and scarcity of resources. The following subsections characterize each of these arrangements.
1.1 The market as a process
For Mises (2010a, p. 317), the market economy is the social system based on the division of labor and private ownership of the means of production. The market directs the activities of individuals along the paths that best serve the needs of their fellow men and is therefore a process driven by the interaction of agents who cooperate on the basis of value judgments. Prices summarize, at each moment, the state of this process: they tell producers what to produce, how to produce and in what quantity. In the market system, the consumer is sovereign. The entrepreneur who does not obey the orders of the public, conveyed by the price system, suffers losses and is replaced by another able to fulfill that purpose.
Mises further observes that the presence of State-owned companies does not alter the essential characteristics of the market. All companies must adjust to its mechanics and, even when public funds cover deficits, the supremacy of the market does not change: the loss is merely shifted to other areas of the economy.
Hayek (2013) emphasizes the role of prices in coordinating knowledge that is dispersed among individuals and that no central body is able to gather:
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances. [...] We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board [...]. We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. (Hayek, 2013)
Iorio (2013) identifies two lines of understanding of how markets work among the Austrians. In the traditional strand (Menger, Mises, Hayek and Kirzner), time is incorporated into the analysis of supply and demand, so that equilibrium is a tendency never reached, since conditions are in permanent transformation. In Lachmann’s strand (1986), the very concept of equilibrium should be abandoned, and the market is understood as a process with neither beginning nor end, owing to the subjectivity of economic dynamics. Both strands reject the possibility of formulating market behavior analytically and understand it as a process of discovery, based on trial and error.
From this framework we derive the characteristics of a free market that will be used in the method of this paper: a State limited to protecting liberty and the functioning of the market (Hayek, 2010); voluntary exchanges among individuals; unobstructed price signals; development of new services; broad private participation; freedom of choice; relief of burdens on agents; openness to international trade; and room for entrepreneurship.
1.2 The provider State and the problem of economic calculation
In the provider State, the information that coordinates production and consumption is obstructed, and the State is forced to define production by means of demand projections, that is, to resort to centralized economic calculation. As early as the 1920s, Mises demonstrated the impossibility of such calculation in the absence of market prices for the factors of production3. To obtain a result equivalent to that of the market, the planner would need the gift of omniscience. Since this is impossible, distortions are inevitable and manifest themselves as shortages and unrealistic prices (Mises, 2010a, p. 864).
Mises (2010a, p. 799) further criticizes mathematical economists who define the market as a mechanical system in static equilibrium and eliminate the entrepreneur from their considerations, “this restless and agitated figure whose constant intervention prevents the imaginary system from reaching a state of perfect equilibrium”. When the price system is suppressed, values have to be “invented” by means of models. As will be seen in section 3, this is precisely the logic of price formation in the Brazilian wholesale electricity market. In short, the provider State is characterized by State ownership or control of companies, the use of centralized economic calculation, protectionism and the absence of entrepreneurship.
1.3 The mixed economy and the dynamics of interventionism
The mixed economy is the predominant form of market organization in the contemporary world and therefore occupies a central place in Austrian analyses. The following subsections present the contributions of four authors to the theory of interventionism.
1.3.1 Ludwig von Mises
Mises (2010a, p. 816) identifies two paths to socialism. In the first, companies are nationalized. In the second, the State does not own the companies but controls them indirectly: private property, markets, prices and wages are nominally preserved, but entrepreneurs become managers bound to obey the orders of the authority in charge of directing production. It is, in the author’s words, “socialism, disguised by the use of capitalist terminology” (Mises, 2010a, p. 817).
In Intervencionismo: uma análise econômica, Mises (2010b, p. 29) shows that intervention does not achieve its intended objective and produces results that, from the government’s own point of view, are even less desirable than those that would be obtained from the free functioning of the market. The example of the maximum price of milk, presented in As seis lições (Mises, 2018), is illustrative: the controlled price increases demand and leads the higher-cost producers to abandon the activity, which reduces supply; to correct the shortage, the government begins to control the prices of inputs, and the cycle repeats itself along the entire production chain.
To analyze restrictive policies, Mises (2010a, p. 845) proposes two questions: are the means chosen by the government suitable for attaining the intended objective? Does the attainment of that objective compensate for the privation imposed on citizens? The administrative procedure adopted does not matter. One may subsidize directly or disguise the subsidy through tariffs but, either way, it is the consumer who foots the bill (Mises, 2010a, p. 844).
Mises concludes that interventionism is unworkable as a lasting system, for the following reasons:
First: restrictive measures always reduce output and the quantity of goods available for consumption. [...] Second: all varieties of interference with market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends sought but also bring about a state of affairs which the author of the intervention himself, from the point of view of his own value judgments, considers worse than the situation he intended to alter. [...] Third: interventionism seeks to confiscate the “surplus” of one part of the population and to distribute it to another part. Once this surplus has been entirely confiscated, it becomes impossible to continue with this policy. (Mises, 2010a, p. 968)
At the end of interventionism, the author concludes, “men will have to choose between the market economy and socialism”, without being able to escape this choice by means of an intermediate position (Mises, 2010a, p. 968). Three contributions of Mises therefore stand out: the recursive character of interventionism, in which one intervention generates the next; the dissatisfaction of consumers and the scarcity resulting from restrictions on prices and on the means of production; and the prediction of the end of interventionism through the exhaustion of the resources that finance it.
1.3.2 Sanford Ikeda
Ikeda (1997) is possibly the most controversial author on the subject. For him, neither free enterprise nor the provider State is stable, and observations of these extremes are rare. Market dynamics would work like a seesaw, leaning now toward relatively free markets, now toward central planning, around an interventionist equilibrium. The funds that sustain the State’s shortcomings could be supplemented by sources of revenue not considered by Mises, so that there would be no necessary end to interventionism.
Ikeda (1997, p. 196) also argues that the minimal State is unstable. Even there, government errors occur, as in setting taxes, and the citizen who perceives them tends to seek correction by political means, which triggers a “snowball” effect of State expansion. The intensity of this impulse depends on the magnitude of the error, the number of citizens affected and the ideological convictions of each regarding the expansion of the State.
Gordon (1997), in reviewing the book, questions the need for an endogenous explanation of interventionist dynamics when appealing to external causes is simpler, and suggests that Ikeda complicated an argument that, in Mises, is quite straightforward. Indeed, the observation that fully free or fully State-run markets are rare is correct, but the thesis of a stable interventionism does not seem to find support in the case analyzed here, in which the continuous expansion of the State is observed.
1.3.3 Robert Bradley
Bradley (2003) agrees with Ikeda on the possibility of stability of interventionism, but proposes a more detailed typology of interventions. An intervention may be dormant, when it does not affect agents’ decisions, or causal, when it does. Among causal interventions, only those that produce consequences trigger a cumulative process, in which the State’s response can take three forms: contraction, revision or expansion of State activity in the market. Bradley does not assert the existence of an end to interventionism, but shows that a sequence of contractions could naturally lead to a smaller State share.
1.3.4 Fabio Barbieri
Barbieri (2013) organizes the Austrian theory of interventionism around two questions. The first is ideological: does the tendency to support interventionism stem from human nature or from a cultural heritage? The second concerns the transitions between models, which are marked by asymmetries. Interventionism forms privileged groups that resist contraction; in societies accustomed to centralized decisions, the imagination needed to conceive market solutions is weakened; and agents need time to acquire the knowledge required by a liberalized market, which weakens reforms. Hence the debate between “shock therapy” and gradualism.
The author also resorts to a biological analogy: the growth of the parasite (the interventions) reduces the survival capacity of the host (the market), and the removal of the parasite depends on the degree to which the structures of both have become intertwined. The end of interventionism would thus be associated with the difficulty of this removal and with the host’s capacity to endure the parasite.
1.4 Contributions of public choice and regulation theory
Although it does not belong to the Austrian tradition, the public choice school (public choice) has been useful for predicting the movement of interventions. It analyzes politics with the tools of economics, starting from premises such as the following: political agents are individuals who respond to incentives; nobody becomes a saint on entering politics; and the State, when it intervenes, does so through people who decide on the basis of imprecise information, which gives rise to government failures (Gianturco, 2018, p. 44). Politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and voters relate to one another reciprocally, but with unequal powers.
Four theories explain most regulatory outcomes (Gianturco, 2018, p. 378): capture theory, according to which the regulated, who know the sector better, tend to influence the regulators; special interest theory, which predicts that the legislator is captured by those with the most to gain or lose; McChesney’s money for nothing theory, according to which the mere threat of regulation mobilizes resources of the affected agents; and Yandle’s bootleggers and baptists theory (1983, 2010), which describes the alliance between groups with different principles, one driven by morality and the other by economic interest, around the same regulation. In general, the criterion that supports the approval of a regulation is not its economic efficiency but the political strength of its supporters.
Gianturco (2018, p. 384) adds that regulation is subject to recognition, action and effect lags, and generates budgeted, compliance and hidden costs, the latter impossible to measure because they correspond to what would have happened in the absence of the rule. By creating costs, regulation induces new reactions: standardization, lobbying, transfer of costs to the consumer, informal markets and, above all, more regulation. Turgot (2011) already pointed out that State regulation tends to produce worse and more expensive goods, to limit innovation and to confer power on bureaucrats with interests of their own. By keeping competitors out, regulation favors oligopolies and monopolies in which companies can afford to be inefficient, since the consumer has no alternatives.
2. Method for analyzing interventions
The framework presented provides a set of tools for the analysis of interventionism. In this paper, three premises are adopted. The first is the cycle of interventionism: the authors are unanimous that intervention is part of a cycle of expansion and contraction that generates consequences and provokes new interventions, so that the analysis must identify these elements and how they are linked. The second concerns the end of interventionism: although Ikeda and Bradley diverge from Mises, the interventionist equilibrium does not hold in the BES, which experiences continuous State expansion; it is therefore assumed that expansionist interventions lead to the provider State and contractionary interventions to the free market. The third is the sustaining of inefficiencies: it is necessary to assess the government’s capacity to finance the inefficiencies it creates and citizens’ willingness to bear these costs.
Figure 1 summarizes the method. Starting from a reference situation, each intervention is classified according to its direction (expansion or contraction of the State), its consequences are identified, and it is verified whether they close the cycle or motivate a new intervention. The procedure brings out the relation of cause and consequence and makes it possible to identify the beginning of the chain of interventions.

Source: Prepared by the authors.
To judge the direction of each intervention, a minimum set of eight questions is proposed, derived from the characteristics of the free market presented in subsection 1.1. Did the intervention: (1) enable or facilitate voluntary exchanges? (2) improve price signals? (3) encourage the development of new services? (4) allow greater participation of private companies? (5) expand freedom of choice? (6) relieve burdens on agents? (7) attract foreign companies? (8) expand the room for entrepreneurship? Predominantly positive answers indicate contraction of the State; predominantly negative answers, expansion.
3. The Brazilian electricity sector and the interventions
3.1 Particularities of electricity systems
The importance of electricity to society is easily quantifiable in industry. Table 1 shows the share of energy in the production costs of some electricity-intensive sectors. An increase in the cost of energy implies higher product prices, loss of competitiveness and, ultimately, the impoverishment of citizens. Bassi et al. (2009) documented these effects when analyzing climate policies that put a price on carbon, with loss of competitiveness, greater vulnerability to imports and technological lag.
|
Industrial sector |
Energy intensity (%) |
|---|---|
|
Chemicals |
10.2 |
|
Petrochemicals |
8.0 |
|
Alkalis and chlorine |
38.9 |
|
Primary aluminum production |
26.5 |
|
Paper and paperboard mills |
14.5 |
Source: Bassi et al. (2009).
Organizing the delivery of this good according to the best market practices faces specific challenges. An electricity system is made up of generation (dispatchable, such as hydroelectric and thermal plants, or non-dispatchable, such as wind and solar), network infrastructure (transmission and distribution) and consumption. For energy to reach its destination, three physical balances must be maintained at every instant: frequency, between load and active power generation; voltage, between load and reactive power generation; and angle, among the generators connected to the same system. Violating any of them for a few seconds can lead to instability and the shutdown of the entire system. The supply of electricity therefore depends on a set of services that make delivery possible with the desired quality and reliability (Silva, 2012).
The commercial relationship among agents varies with the degree of intervention. Hunt (2002) distinguishes four models: (1) vertically integrated monopoly; (2) single buyer, in which generators sell to a company that centralizes purchases and passes the costs on to consumers; (3) wholesale competition, in which large consumers negotiate freely with generators; and (4) retail competition, in which small consumers also choose their suppliers, generally through retailers. These models measure the distance from the provider State but do not address interventionism. Brazil formally fits model 3 but, as will be seen, the large number of interventions distorts much of this arrangement.
3.2 Historical and institutional organization
Historically, the BES has experienced the three forms of market organization described in section 1, as summarized in Table 2. The provider State model, consolidated in the postwar period with the creation of Eletrobras, was abandoned in the 1990s because of the State’s inability to manage the companies and finance new projects.
|
Period |
Starting point |
Characteristics |
|---|---|---|
|
Illuminated beginnings |
1879 |
First public lighting installations, using Thomas Edison’s technology. |
|
Old Republic |
1891 |
Foreign investment (Light, in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro; Amforp); gold clause in contracts; self-production. |
|
Vargas Era |
1937 |
State-owned companies; Water Code. |
|
Postwar |
1945 |
Creation of Eletrobras; nationalization; rapid expansion, followed by the “lost decade”. |
|
Redemocratization |
1988 |
Exhaustion of sector funds; defaults among companies; stalled projects. |
|
Unbundling |
1998 |
Partial privatizations; separation between ACR and ACL; regulatory agencies; 2001 rationing. |
|
Model reform |
2004 |
Investment crisis; regulated auctions and long-term contracts in the ACR. |
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The current organization divides the market into two contracting environments (Oliveira & Salomão, 2017). In the Regulated Contracting Environment (ACR), consumers are served by distribution concessionaires that hold the monopoly over a given geographic area, and all costs are passed on through regulated tariffs. In the Free Contracting Environment (ACL), consumers choose from whom they buy energy, through bilateral contracts with generators and traders, and only network costs are paid through tariffs. In 2023, the ACL accounted for about 38% of the country’s electricity consumption, with an average energy price close to half of that in the ACR (Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica [CCEE], 2023).
The unbundling of the 1990s allowed private capital to enter, but was accompanied by an extensive regulatory apparatus that preserved State control over the main production decisions. The regulatory agency, ANEEL, began to define market policies, alongside several other oversight bodies.
3.3 Main interventions and their consequences
Describing the BES from the Austrian perspective means identifying the interventions carried out over the years. Applying the method of section 2, the starting point is the State’s inability to manage the sector, which motivated the unbundling and privatizations of the 1990s, a contraction. To attract private capital without giving up control, however, the State introduced a set of expansionist interventions, summarized in Table 3 together with their consequences and estimated costs for 2023. Adding up the quantifiable parts, the interventions cost consumers approximately R$ 130 billion that year.
|
Intervention |
Direction |
Consequence |
Cost in 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Regulated tariff |
Expansion |
Inability to correct prices in a timely manner; sector loans (COVID and Water Scarcity accounts). |
R$ 6.7 billion |
|
Long-term auctions |
Expansion |
Guaranteed revenue for generators; energy cost higher than in the free market. |
R$ 72 billion |
|
Monopoly concession |
Expansion |
Consumers prevented from choosing their supplier. |
Not quantifiable |
|
Price calculation |
Expansion |
Prices set by computational models; obstruction of price signals. |
Not quantifiable |
|
Centralized planning |
Expansion |
Government determines supply expansion; reserve auctions to correct projection errors. |
R$ 12 billion |
|
Public policies (CDE) |
Expansion |
Funding of government policies through the tariff (17 expense items). |
R$ 40 billion |
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ANEEL (2023a, 2024) and CCEE (2023).
The regulated tariff eliminates the price signal to the consumer, since the amount charged is set by ANEEL in periodic adjustment (annual) and review (every four or five years, depending on the concession contract) processes. When events not foreseen in the calculation occurred, such as the 2014 water crisis, the drop in consumption during the 2020 pandemic and the 2021 water scarcity, it was necessary to resort to bank loans to cover the costs, to be charged later to the consumer’s tariff: the ACR Account (already paid off), the COVID Account (R$ 16 billion) and the Water Scarcity Account (R$ 10.8 billion), whose repayment amounts to about R$ 6.7 billion per year.
The long-term auctions resulted from the 2004 reform. The model required distribution companies to contract all their energy in regulated auctions, with long-term contracts indexed to price indices, in order to guarantee generators’ revenue. Since distributors pass costs on to consumers, they have no incentive to seek lower prices. It is estimated that, in 2023, regulated consumers paid about R$ 72 billion more than they would have paid at market prices4.
The monopoly concession was the way to attract private enterprise while keeping the mold of State organization: companies ceased to be managed by the State and came to be controlled by it, and consumers remained unable to choose their supplier. Price calculation reproduces exactly the process criticized by Mises. Brazil adopts a centralized dispatch model (tight pool), in which plants are dispatched in order of cost, as defined by the regulator. Generators decide neither how much they produce nor at what price, which creates revenue unpredictability and prices insufficient to remunerate investments. The response, once again, was a new intervention: the obligation of long-term contracts that ensure cost recovery.
Centralized planning is carried out by the Energy Research Company (EPE), which projects demand and the plants’ supply capacity (the “physical guarantee”) for the following ten years. When these projections prove mistaken, the government contracts additional energy in reserve auctions, whose cost is shared among all consumers through the Reserve Energy Charge, R$ 12 billion in 2023. Finally, the public policies funded by the Energy Development Account (CDE), which brings together 17 expense items, including subsidies for the social tariff, incentivized sources, irrigation, coal, isolated systems and DG itself, totaled R$ 40 billion in 2023 (ANEEL, 2024).
To illustrate the effect on the consumer, Figure 2 compares the residential tariff of the Light concessionaire, in Rio de Janeiro, in force in 2023, with a simulated tariff in which the costs of the interventions are removed. In this hypothetical scenario, charges (R$ 211 per 1,000 kWh) would cease to exist, the price of energy would fall from R$ 307 to R$ 72 (the free-market reference value) and the tariff discount of R$ 65 would also disappear. The consumer would pay R$ 429 per 1,000 kWh instead of R$ 810; in other words, the current tariff is almost double the one that would result from the absence of these interventions.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on ANEEL (2023a).
3.4 Financing the interventions and the political forces
As the Austrian authors observed, maintaining State control depends on funds capable of covering the inefficiencies created, resources that could not be obtained in the market. In the BES, this constraint was resolved expeditiously: Treasury contributions were replaced by charges levied on the tariff. For a residential consumer, CDE subsidies account for about 13% of the bill (ANEEL, 2024). The existence of a source of funds outside the public budget has encouraged the growing use of the tariff to finance political decisions. Proposals to transfer these costs to the Federal Budget run up against the lack of fiscal space, which shows the exhaustion of government funds and shifts the question to the consumer’s capacity and willingness to keep bearing them.
Is it possible to reverse the interventions? Four recent episodes illustrate the forces at play. Among the attempts at contraction, the sector modernization proposal, begun in 2017 with broad participation of the agents and converted into Bill 414/2021, did not obtain support for approval. The privatization of Eletrobras, authorized by Law No. 14,182/2021, required great political effort and was approved with provisions unrelated to its purpose, such as the compulsory contracting of thermal plants, to the point that opposing parties voted against the bill5. The company was capitalized with about R$ 33.7 billion, while the thermal plants imposed by the law would have an estimated cost of R$ 52 billion to consumers (CNN Brasil, 2021).
In the direction of expansion, Law No. 14,300/2022, which established the legal framework for DG and is the subject of section 4, went through what was considered a lightning-fast passage in the Senate in December 2021. Bill 11,247/2018, which was meant only to regulate offshore wind power, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in November 2023 with amendments whose cost was estimated at R$ 25 billion per year for consumers (Poder360, 2023). It is thus clear that contracting interventions requires a great deal of political effort and, when it happens, comes with new interventions, whereas expansions advance with ease. The tendency is for contraction to become viable only with the exhaustion of the model.
4. The distributed generation promotion program
Installing solar panels on the roof to generate one’s own power may sound like a victory for individual freedom against a monopoly created by the State. A simple question, however, is enough to better understand this success: why did it happen only now? The answer lies in the public policy encouraging DG. Figure 3 shows the capacity added to the system between 2013 and 2023, by source: DG grew the most, with about 27 GW installed, surpassing the expansion of all other sources (ANEEL, 2023b, 2023c). Achieving this result required large incentives and a great deal of political strength, and the process is a true public choice case study.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on ANEEL (2023b, 2023c).
4.1 History of the policy’s implementation
Yandle (1983) observed that bootleggers and Baptists defended the same cause, the prohibition of Sunday alcohol sales, the former out of economic interest, the latter out of moral conviction. The case of DG was no different: environmental activists and companies in the sector joined forces to implement and preserve the incentives for “clean” energy. The implementation of the policy went through three stages.
In the first (2012 to 2019), of expansion, ANEEL, in the context of the subsidies already granted to large-scale wind and solar sources, created through Normative Resolution No. 482/2012 the electricity compensation (net-metering) system for ACR consumers who invested in small-scale generation, despite criticism that it exceeded its authority. In the second (2019 to 2021), of revision, ANEEL itself, recognizing the impacts on other consumers, proposed in Public Consultation No. 25/2019 the gradual reduction of incentives. There was a strong reaction from companies, unions and associations, summed up in the slogan “taxing the sun”, and the issue left the agency’s purview and entered the agenda of the National Congress through Bill 5,829/2019. In the third, with a great deal of money at stake, an attractive social discourse and a demobilized regulatory agency, the bill was approved by the Chamber in August 2021 and by the Senate on December 15 of the same year; the Senate amendments were voted on by the Chamber the following day, and Law No. 14,300 was signed into law on January 6, 2022, preserving the full benefits until 2045 for those who joined the system by early 2023.
The episode is a clear example of the logic described by Mises. In creating the incentive, the regulator did not foresee its impact on society, which required a revision; in trying to reverse it, it ran into capture, in which the regulated party comes to define the regulator’s action, in this case through the Legislature. For the policy to achieve such an impact, it was decisive to exempt participants from paying for a large part of the services provided by distributors, which was done through the compensation system.
4.2 The electricity compensation system
“Cut your electricity bill by up to 95%”: this was one of the commercial slogans spread after the publication of REN No. 482/2012 (G1, 2020). The reduction was possible thanks to the Electricity Compensation System (SCEE), in which the energy injected into the grid by the photovoltaic panel generates a credit equivalent to the value of the entire tariff, and not only of the energy component. As subsection 3.3 showed, however, energy is only one of the components of the tariff; it would be consistent for the injected energy to offset only the avoided cost of energy.
For every 1,000 kWh injected by the photovoltaic panel, the distributor avoids a cost of about R$ 307; these same kWh, however, entitle the owner to a credit of R$ 8106. Table 4 compares the bill of a consumer who generates the equivalent of their consumption in three situations: under the SCEE rules, with compensation of the energy component only, and without DG.
|
Situation |
Consumption tariff (R$/kWh) |
Value of DG credit (R$/kWh) |
Bill (R$) |
|---|---|---|---|
|
With SCEE |
0.81 |
0.81 |
40.53 |
|
Compensation of energy only |
0.81 |
0.31 |
503.46 |
|
Without DG |
0.81 |
0.00 |
810.62 |
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ANEEL (2023a).
With the SCEE, the bill is reduced by 95%; if the credit offset only energy, the reduction would be 38%. For every 1,000 kWh generated, R$ 462.93 in costs that are not avoided by DG go unpaid and are therefore transferred to third parties. This proves the conceptual distortion created by the SCEE.
4.3 Characterization of the intervention
The criteria of section 2 are then applied to determine whether the policy points toward State expansion or toward free enterprise. Table 5 presents the result.
|
Criterion |
Assessment |
|---|---|
|
1. Did it facilitate voluntary exchanges? |
No. The relationship remains restricted to the consumer and the distributor. |
|
2. Did it improve price signals? |
No. The SCEE further reduced price signals to ACR consumers. |
|
3. Did it encourage new services? |
Partly. Jobs emerged in system installation, but jobs created by subsidies tend to destroy jobs in other sectors (Álvarez et al., 2010). |
|
4. Did it expand private participation? |
Yes. Each consumer became an investor in generation, and thousands of installation companies emerged (Portal Solar, 2024). |
|
5. Did it expand freedom of choice? |
Partly. Consumers gained an alternative but remain prevented from choosing their supplier in the free market. |
|
6. Did it relieve burdens on agents? |
No. The policy burdened consumers who did not join DG. |
|
7. Did it attract foreign companies? |
No. Despite high demand, equipment remained mostly imported, with no significant establishment of manufacturers in the country. |
|
8. Did it expand entrepreneurship? |
Yes, but dependent on incentives; once these end, it tends to shrink. |
Source: Prepared by the authors.
With predominantly negative answers or answers conditional on incentives, the policy is characterized as an expansion of the State, in the direction opposite to the free market. Four reflections follow from this conclusion. The first concerns the behavior of the consumer subjected to a coercive monopoly: obliged to pay the tariff set by ANEEL, the consumer occupies a passive place in the market, and their dissatisfaction finds only one outlet, which is to pressure the government, in contrast to what happens in competitive markets.
The second concerns government efforts to encourage renewable sources, which have led to the violation of market principles. By privileging a given source, the government creates a market reserve for a group, with consequences unforeseen at the time of the intervention, notably the volume of subsidies paid by consumers who did not join DG. The third is that the SCEE creates a market without prices, which misguides agents’ decisions; the threat of losing the benefit set off a rush to join, with queues and protests for its continuation, and the response was a law whose approval process confirms the predictions of public choice.
Finally, Austrian theory shows that the policy is merely one more stage in a cycle of interventions that seeks to correct the effects of earlier regulations. Empowering consumers should mean making them free to choose in a market. In the case analyzed, the power conferred on some consumers was obtained at the cost of impoverishing others, and resulted in a cycle of dissatisfaction and in market losses for distributors that tend, once again, to be socialized.
4.4 The impacts of the policy
4.4.1 The cost of the policy
If one consumer is exempted from most of the costs of the tariff, someone will foot the bill. Since the tariff results from the ratio between the revenue required by the distributor and the billed market, and DG reduces only the billed market without reducing costs in the same proportion, the tariff rises for consumers who did not join the system. This cost, published by ANEEL, reached about R$ 7.3 billion in 2023 and totals approximately R$ 13 billion accumulated up to then, in January 2024 values (ANEEL, 2024).
4.4.2 The viability of the projects
Analyzing the viability of the projects makes it possible to assess the role of each intervention in the success of the policy. The simple payback time (payback) is adopted for a photovoltaic system sized for 1,000 kWh per month, whose commercial cost was estimated at R$ 33,400 (equipment, labor and maintenance)7. The consumer’s monthly savings correspond to the difference between the bill without and with DG, assessed in four scenarios: (1) current tariff and SCEE offsetting the entire tariff, which is the current model; (2) current tariff and SCEE offsetting energy only; (3) tariff without the costs of the interventions identified in subsection 3.3 and SCEE offsetting the entire tariff; and (4) tariff without interventions and SCEE offsetting energy only. Table 6 presents the results.
|
Scenario |
Tariff |
Compensation |
Bill without DG (R$) |
Bill with DG (R$) |
Monthly savings (R$) |
Payback (years) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
1 |
Current |
Entire tariff |
810.62 |
40.53 |
770.09 |
3.6 |
|
2 |
Current |
Energy only |
810.62 |
503.46 |
307.16 |
9.1 |
|
3 |
Without interventions |
Entire tariff |
429.45 |
21.47 |
407.97 |
6.8 |
|
4 |
Without interventions |
Energy only |
429.45 |
357.45 |
72.00 |
38.7 |
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Under the current rules, the investment is recovered in only 3.6 years. If the credit offset only energy, the period would rise to 9.1 years. In the absence of the interventions that burden the tariff, but with the SCEE, the payback would take 6.8 years. And without interventions and with the correct compensation criterion, the period would jump to about 39 years, which would make the investment economically unviable.
It follows that the promotion of DG resulted from the combination of two factors: tariffs raised by earlier interventions and the SCEE subsidy. In isolation, the subsidy reduces the payback from 9.1 to 3.6 years, a reduction of about 60%. Without the set of interventions, residential DG would not be attractive. The success of the policy is therefore a direct consequence of the interventionism accumulated in the sector, as the theory predicts.
4.4.3 The reliability of operation
“It matters when electricity is produced”, sums up The Economist (2023): a barrel of oil is worth the same at noon or at midnight, but a megawatt-hour is worth much less in the small hours than at times of peak consumption. Where does energy come from when the solar panels are not generating? Is the price of energy the same during the day and at night? Questions crucial to the coordination of the physical system are neglected in the name of policy. Solar sources are intermittent and pose challenges to reliability. The National Electric System Operator (ONS, 2022) warned that cascading disconnections of distributed resources after transmission contingencies can amplify blackouts; that the increase in DG requires greater power reserves for the load ramp at the end of the day; that solar DG reduces the system’s inertia and short-circuit levels; and that high penetration in periods of minimum load can cause overvoltages in the transmission grid.
In Brazil, these costs are not passed on to the market, since the centralized price calculation does not take them into account, and only the operator holds information on the impacts on system security. It is therefore impossible to price them properly. The European experience, which has faced these challenges for longer and has market mechanisms for reliability, indicates that integration costs grow with the share of variable renewable sources (Joos & Staffell, 2018).
Electrical insecurity related to the surplus of energy, especially solar, led the electricity System Operator, ONS, to call for a new guideline allowing it to intervene directly in small plants. In November 2025, ANEEL approved the Emergency Plan for Generation Curtailment in Distribution, through Order No. 3,431/2025, establishing procedures to enable the reduction of generation from plants classified as Type III in situations of risk to the operational security of the National Interconnected System (SIN) (ANEEL, 2025).
4.5 Prognosis: the end of interventionism?
Identifying the end of interventionism is a complex task, since the State’s limit for maintaining its policies is unknown, and Ikeda (1997) goes so far as to dismiss this hypothesis. Nevertheless, with each layer of intervention new consequences arise that result in greater State participation. As seen in subsection 3.4, attempts at contraction met great resistance or were approved at a high cost. Speculating about the end of interventionism means assessing the room that still remains for new measures until the possibilities are exhausted.
At least two actions were already under discussion when this research was carried out. The first is to transfer the costs to other consumers, socializing ACR costs with ACL consumers and with self-producers, who have no relation to these costs. Along the same lines, Provisional Measure No. 1,232/2024 transferred about R$ 3 billion in costs of the Amazonas distributor to consumers throughout the country. Depending on the form adopted, socialization could raise the cost of energy for self-producing industry by about 43% (Jota, 2023). The second is to resort to coercion to preserve the paying market of the distributors. Bill 4,831/2023, whose urgency regime was approved by the Chamber in February 2024, proposed, in the renewal of distribution concessions, to require 70% of consumers to remain in the regulated market and to limit to 10% the consumers eligible to join the compensation system (da Silva, 2024b).
None of these initiatives had moved forward by the time this article was published. Others, however, deserve attention. Law 15,269 of November 23, 2025 established a new framework for the Brazilian electricity sector, creating, among other interventions, a spending cap that limits the pass-through of costs to the tariff of other consumers. In the case of distributed generation promotion, it is estimated that in 2027 R$ 4.4 billion will not be passed on to electricity consumers (ANEEL, 2026b). Thus, a new layer of intervention can be observed, in this case in the direction of withdrawal, though still far from individual freedom.
According to the Austrian School, the solution for the return of prosperity and efficiency is to restore free enterprise, so that consumers can choose suppliers, without market reserves. The experience of California, which moved from the provider State to a liberalized market in the 1990s and faced a severe crisis a few years later, offers important lessons. McMillan (2005) showed that the crisis that occurred soon after the liberalization of the market did not stem from economic freedom, but rather from a mistaken view of the free market:
California’s electricity market thus stumbled over the most elementary requirement of market design: prices must reflect production costs. With the retail price fixed, the system had no means of responding to scarcity. [...] California deregulated with half measures. The mixture of prices set through controls and by the market was incompatible: it made no sense to free wholesale prices and keep retail prices fixed. (McMillan, 2005)
The author concludes that, however necessary deregulation may be, the details of its implementation are decisive, and cites Norway and Australia as success stories, in which most energy is traded in long-term contracts and retail prices follow generation costs. The lesson for Brazil is that the Californian crisis stemmed precisely from the combination of free prices and controlled prices, that is, from the persistence of interventions, and not from liberalization itself. The conviction that opening the market is the way forward, together with the correction of design errors, can guide the first steps toward returning the BES to the market. The good news is that Law 15,269/2025 makes it possible to pave the way for the success of a free market.
Concluding remarks
The analysis of the DG promotion policy from the Austrian perspective reveals that the apparent nobility of its objectives, such as promoting consumer autonomy and promoting renewable sources, is replaced by an intricate web of interventions, costs and operational challenges.
As a consequence of the DG promotion policy, it was observed that excessive subsidies contributed to making the expansion of solar power the largest among energy generation technologies in recent years, with the following impacts identified:
-
Regulatory capture: when attempts were made to reduce the incentives, organized groups secured the continuation of the incentive policy in the National Congress.
-
Cross-subsidy: by joining the compensation systems, consumers obtained 95% discounts on their electricity bill, but the cost was passed on to consumers who did not join the system.
-
Project viability: the subsidies reduced the payback time of the projects by about 50%.
-
Cost: ANEEL data show that the DG promotion policy cost R$ 7.14 billion in 2023 (in 2025 the cost reached 16 billion).
-
Reliability: owing to the intermittency and unpredictability of distributed solar power, new efforts have been needed to ensure continuity of energy supply in Brazil, notably the implementation of emergency generation curtailments to avoid large-scale instability in the Brazilian electricity system.
The proposed method, which combines the identification of the causal chain of interventions with explicit criteria of direction, proved capable of characterizing the policy as an expansion of the State and of placing it in a chain of interventions that begins with the incomplete reform of the 1990s. It was estimated that interventions in the BES cost consumers about R$ 130 billion in 2023 and that, had they not existed, the residential tariff analyzed would fall from R$ 810 to R$ 429 for a consumption of 1,000 kWh. In that scenario, residential DG would cease to be attractive, which shows that earlier interventions create the conditions of high tariffs that justified the success of the policy. The apparent freedom of choice granted to the consumer is therefore nothing more than a new layer of intervention.
The exhaustion of government funds, evidenced by the transfer of costs to the tariff and by the Treasury’s refusal to take them back, brings the sector closer to the scenario predicted by Mises. Proposals to socialize costs and to restrict the migration of consumers indicate that interventionism is seeking new sources of financing and new forms of coercion. The choice between continuing down this path and returning to a market economy emerges as a critical crossroads for the future of the sector.
This paper has limitations. The estimated costs are based on 2023 data and on a single tariff case, and the payback was calculated in a simplified way. Future research may assess the consequences of the gradual reduction of DG subsidies provided for in Law No. 14,300/2022, including on employment in the sector; quantify the impact of interventions on Brazil’s position in economic freedom and competitiveness indicators; and propose a roadmap for the transition of the Brazilian electricity market from a mixed economy to free enterprise.