1. INTRODUCTION
Greek Philosophy – like Roman Law and Christianity – is one of the fundamental pillars in the formation of what is understood today as the West. Whether one is aware of this influence or not, it manifests itself latently in the way of thinking, in behavior, in literature, in theater and in cinema; in short, in most of the culture of contemporary man who lives on this side of the globe.
Ancient Greece, which is considered the cradle of philosophy, went through a long process of maturation of thought, ranging from the ancient and mythological writings of Homer and Hesiod, through the historical records of Thucydides and Herodotus, delving into the ideas of Pythagoras, Parmenides and Heraclitus, becoming involved with the nebulous and controversial sophistic method, to finally emerge with the humanist thought of Socrates, the one who would be responsible for – besides preparing the way for Plato and Aristotle – revolutionizing the entire history of Philosophy.
It is interesting to note that, throughout this historical process, there was always a specific agenda that was of great interest to the Greeks and that permeated almost all of their cultural production, whether through its indirect exposition in the Homeric epics or even in investigation by means of the Aristotelian analytical method – a theme that was of great interest to the man who, from then on, began to organize himself in communities known as pólis. This is the study of Ethics, or the search for knowledge of what it is to do the right thing and, thus, of how to live a good life.
Socrates, although he left no written record, was immortalized through the dialogues of his most illustrious disciple, Plato, where he always appeared as the protagonist of his works. That is, even though these are situations that are not literally true in their matter – at least not in all cases and in their entirety – they are so in their form, so that Plato, by means of his master's dialectical method, structures his own philosophy.
Plato, through what became known as “the second voyage”, effectively inaugurated the investigation of Metaphysics, devoted to defining and understanding the real essence of things, thus delving into a vigorous investigation of Being and, consequently, of the origin and nature of the cosmos. Moreover, when analyzing the Platonic dialogues, it is difficult to list themes of a moral order that are not present there. In his work, debate on topics such as wisdom, justice and even politics is common, and, it can be said, the aim of the discussions always points in the same direction, that is, toward the search for knowledge of things in themselves. That is, it is systematically an exercise that seeks to leave the bias of the observer – as the sophists did – in order to come to know things as such and, in knowing them, to be able to establish and distinguish their essential characteristics from their accidental attributes. The philosopher intended, by means of a dialectical method, to discover the universal elements that make possible the recognition of the forms of what can be perceived in sensible reality; in other words, he sought to know formal universality amid the multiplicity of beings.
Through these reflections, Plato organizes his entire philosophy and gradually introduces his most famous theory: the Theory of Ideas (or of Forms), embodied, at its high point, in the famous Allegory of the Cave, which is considered one of the fundamental keys to understanding the thought of the Greek philosopher. According to this theory, there would be the sensible world – or world of the senses – which is the world materially inhabited by man, existing as a sort of imperfect copy of an intelligible plane that encompasses all the possibilities of what may come to be. That is, according to this logic, for something to manifest itself in reality, it must first exist as a possibility, which means that the Form of the being perceived by the senses would already exist as intelligible Being even before its material genesis. In other words, the being only comes to be because the possibility of its manifestation is already given a priori – a possibility that is represented by the ideal Form of this being, in its Being par excellence. It should be noted that this manifestation of the being in the sensible world participates, to a greater or lesser degree, in its intelligible Form, which will characterize its level of perfection.
Despite the extensive work of the philosopher of the Academy – which, it should be noted, has survived practically unscathed to the present day – there is one work that always appears alongside its author's name and that condenses some of his main ideas. This is the Republic, Πολιτεία, or politeía, which, if translated literally, could be rendered as “form of government” or “form of organization”.
In this dialogue, the foundation of his investigation is the same as that set out above. In an attempt to set forth what Justice is, Plato goes on to represent the ideal city, the Form of the pólis, in order to discover when and in what way this virtue manifests itself.
What is observed, however, is that Plato, throughout his exposition in the Republic, makes use of a worldview well established among the thinkers of his time: that there is a homogeneity in the laws that sustain the whole cosmos. That is, according to this understanding, everything that is manifests itself respecting the same principles and, in such a way, the same “rules” that apply to Man also apply to everything that surrounds him. This point is of utmost importance for the debate, since Plato, in his investigation of the ideal city, establishes an analogy between it and the human soul, proposing that the two, being isomorphic, would behave in the same way, and that the former is nothing more than a large-scale projection of the latter.
Now, having established earlier that Ethics would be the science responsible for investigating how to live a good life, that is, that it aims at discovering what universally represents the best way to act, it is reasonable to suppose, based on the Platonic premise set out above, that this same area of knowledge should also have a considerable impact on the construction of a political organization – or organization of the pólis – this being precisely the grouping of men – or souls – living together in community.
The following question therefore arises: what, effectively, is the influence of Ethics, according to Platonic doctrine, on the development of this ideal city?
In seeking to answer this question, this work will be divided into three parts. First, with a brief overview of the spirit of the times in ancient Greece, as well as an exposition of Ethics in the Greek world. At this first stage, the intention is to carry out a hermeneutic analysis of the period and to understand how the manifestation of this branch of knowledge was seen in it.
Next, Plato and his philosophy will be presented, in order to achieve a better understanding of his doctrine, creating the conditions for a correct interpretation of the work that is the reference of this analysis.
Finally, the foundations evidenced in the Republic will be addressed in greater depth, seeking to draw parallels with what was presented earlier, in order to arrive at a solution to the problem.
2. DEVELOPMENT
2.1 ANCIENT GREECE
First of all, a historical analysis of the period in question becomes important. That is, it is not by chance that the Socratic-Platonic phenomenon is observed in ancient Greece. Among the various aspects that distinguished the Greek people from others and that, without a doubt, made possible and induced such a historical event, the following stand out above all: (1) Greek political organization, which took place in the configuration of the so-called pólis; as well as (2) the existence of an environment and a collective imagination greatly matured by a recent process of emergence and consolidation of Philosophy. Thus, it can be seen that Greek social, political and cultural conditions contributed decisively to the appearance of such singular figures as Socrates and Plato.
The genesis of the Greek pólis has its roots in the invasions of the Dorian peoples from the north around the 12th century B.C., which stimulated the formation of decentralized groupings of regional tribes, a process that only effectively crystallized around the 8th century B.C.:
In the disorders that followed the Dorian invasion, the old Mycenaean kingdoms were destroyed. The people of the small valleys of Greece's irregular surface united to defend themselves. They crowded within the city walls when an invasion occurred and, if the opportunity arose, they tried to leave it and make a raid on some neighboring valley.
Gradually, the Greeks began to create the ideal of the pólis, an autonomous community formed by a main city and a small strip of cultivated land around it. (Asimov, 2022, p. 26)
Furthermore:
This aggregate, the pre-Dorian city, in most cases did not survive the Dorian invasion – although in the most important case, that of Athens, continuity between the Aegean settlement and the later pólis seems to have remained intact. The Hellenic type of pólis was probably created by refugees from mainland Greece who conquered old settlements or founded new ones in a strange environment on the eastern coast of the Aegean. From the Anatolian coast, the newly created form spread, by mimesis, throughout mainland Greece. (Voegelin, 2012, p. 188)
The Greek póleis were regarded as decentralized, autonomous and independent political units which, although located in the region known as Greece and sharing certain cultural aspects, such as language and religion, did not together formally constitute a single nation:
The Greeks always preserved their ideal of the autonomous pólis, and that is what freedom consisted of for them, even if it was in reality governed by few men, and despite half the population being made up of slaves.
The Greeks fought to the death for their freedom: they were the only people of their time to do so. And although their idea of freedom is not seen by us as sufficiently broad, it expanded over the centuries, and the ideal of freedom, so important to the modern world, is nothing more than Greek freedom broadened and refined. (Asimov, 2022, p. 28)
It should be noted that in this environment of the emergence of the Greek pólis, political participation was, in general, fundamental. Although not all of its inhabitants were in fact considered citizens, those who were classified as such had the right and the duty to exercise their citizenship through debate on public affairs, in places known as agoras:
The city is now centered on the Agora, the common space that houses the Hestia Koiné, a public space in which problems of general interest are debated. It is the city itself that surrounds itself with walls, protecting and delimiting in its totality the human group that constitutes it. On the site where the royal citadel once rose – a private, privileged residence – it builds temples that it opens to public worship. On the ruins of the palace, on this Acropolis that it henceforth consecrates to its gods, it is still itself that the community projects onto the plane of the sacred, just as it realizes itself, on the profane plane, in the space of the Agora. This urban framework effectively defines a mental space: it discovers a new spiritual horizon. Once it is centered on the public square, the city is already, in the full sense of the term, a pólis. (Vernant, 2002, p. 51)
Thus, one can conjecture with relative confidence about how such a decentralized and free environment of political organization was responsible for ensuring an efficient circulation of ideas that, without a shadow of a doubt, stimulated debate and enabled the maturation of human thought, in contrast to what was done in the great Eastern empires, for example, which erred through excessive centralization and coercion, appreciably reducing the possibility of renowned thinkers appearing. Not by chance, it is in this ecosystem of Greek culture that a new way of thinking emerges, which would later be named Philosophy:
“Philosophy”, whether as a semantic indication (that is, as a lexical term) or as conceptual content, is a peculiar creation of the Greeks. In fact, while for all the other components of Greek civilization an identical correlative is found among other peoples of the East – who reached, before the Greeks, very high levels of progress – there is, on the contrary, no identical correlative of philosophy or, at least, anything comparable to what the Greeks and, later, along with the Greeks, all Westerners called “philosophy”. (Reale, 2012, p. 11)
Furthermore:
Historians have insisted a great deal on the peculiar position of freedom that distinguishes the Greek from the Eastern peoples. The Easterner was bound to a blind obedience to religious power and political power. With regard to religion, we have already seen what freedom the Greek enjoyed. As for political conditions, the discussion is more complex; nevertheless, it can be said that the Greek enjoyed, in this field too, a privileged situation. With the creation of the pólis, the Greek no longer felt any antithesis between the individual and the State and no limit to his own freedom and, on the contrary, was led to understand himself not accidentally, but essentially as a citizen of a given State, of a given pólis. (Reale, 2012, pp. 25–26)
Thus, one can observe the evident relationship between the existence of a reasonable environment of political freedom and the initial manifestations of philosophical thought, whose beginning proper is considered to date from the thinker Thales of Miletus, in the 6th century B.C.
Although philosophical thought had its genesis in the region called Ionia and underwent an evolution in what is now Italy, it is in the Athenian pólis that it would reach its apogee.
The turn from the 6th to the 5th century B.C. in Greece is marked by the beginning of the Persian Wars, in which several Greek póleis united to fight the invading army of the Persian Empire. However, it also signaled the arrival of that century which would be considered the Golden Age of Athens, a context in which this city-state would experience a period of great prosperity and cultural development. In this period, one would see the rise of personalities in the political field, such as Pericles – a great leader responsible for the expansion of Athenian democracy – as well as, in the artistic field, the three great tragedians: Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. One can also highlight the rise of the so-called “sophists”, professionals in the field of teaching and specialists in the discipline of rhetoric.
Thus, it is in this environment that, in 470 B.C., the figure of Socrates would be born, who would be responsible for bringing about a turning point in the history of Philosophy and producing considerable progress in investigations both of an anthropological order and in the branch of ethics. The most prominent of his disciples was Plato, the one who, in his works, would give positive form to his master's method and produce an admirable conceptual edifice which, to a great extent, is still used today in analyses concerning moral science. The backbone of this order is found, without a doubt, in his work The Republic.
2.2 ETHICS IN THE GREEK WORLD
First, it is appropriate to provide some context regarding the field of study of this work, that is, Ethics, above all because this investigation is directed toward a very specific period in the history of this science, when it was still going through a phase of maturation of its understanding and of its theoretical systematization.
When one observes the culture of ancient Greece, the importance that was always given to the formation of the individual is evident. And when one speaks of formation, it is not a matter of a technical and mechanical education that prepares man to exercise a specific trade within a society where there is division of labor. Quite the contrary, it is a formation that aims at the development of human potentialities in all their aspects and, it can be said, with special attention to moral development. The relevance of this perspective was such that there was even a specific term to refer to this integral formation of the individual, the so-called paidéia. This, however, went through several phases, inducing and being induced by historical events, but always taking part in the construction of the collective imagination. It was present from the study of the epic poems that narrated the great battles – where it was still quite rudimentary – up to the later structuring of the philosophical method.
In a more attentive reading of the works of this period – between the 9th and 4th centuries B.C. – it is possible to notice a constant that runs through practically all of them. It is the investigation of what it is to do the right thing and, thus, of how to lead a good life, that is, of how men could select among the various possibilities of action by employing some criterion that seemed to them reliable and objective.
At first, the idea of areté would emerge, a term that is generally translated as virtue, but which points to a notion of excellence:
Both in Homer and in later centuries, the concept of areté is frequently used in its broadest sense, that is, not only to designate human excellence, but also the superiority of non-human beings: the strength of the gods or the courage and speed of thoroughbred horses. (Jaeger, 2013, p. 24)
That is, in a very rudimentary way, areté is understood as that which designates what is good or superior in something according to its nature. In this term it is possible to see a first attempt at delimitation between the better and the worse. The mere fact of the existence of a concept that represents the excellent already demonstrates an understanding that there are things that are objectively superior to others and, therefore, that it would be possible for man to reflect on what the essence of this attribute is and, thus, on how and why this happens.
Now, if excellence is a potency of everything that exists, it must also be so for man. It is deduced, therefore, that there must be a set of human capacities that, when applied universally by any man – since all are composed of exactly the same humanity – would make him superior. It is evident that the perception of these attributes varied according to the historical moment; however, man and his humanity have always remained the same. Thus, it is not that excellence itself changed its essence over the centuries, but that there were moments when the collective perception was more or less close to its true definition.
One observes, for example, in Homer's Iliad:
In general, in accordance with the mode of thought of primitive times, it designates by areté the strength and skill of warriors or fighters and, above all, heroism, considered not in our sense of moral action separate from strength, but rather intimately linked to it. (Jaeger, 2013, p. 25)
In the Odyssey, on the other hand, it “exalts, above all in its main hero, above valor, which moves to a secondary place, prudence and cunning” (Jaeger, 2013).
One can also contrast with these definitions the view of another great poet of the time, Hesiod. For him:
Heroism is not manifested only in battles in the open field, between noble knights and their adversaries. The silent and tenacious struggle of laborers with the hard earth and with the elements also has its heroism and demands discipline, qualities of eternal value for the formation of Man. (Jaeger, 2013, p. 84)
That is, at this time, although there was still no consensus on what the true attributes delimiting human excellence would be, one notices several attempts on the part of the poets to exalt what they saw as noble, whether heroism in combat or even ordinary everyday work.
One cannot fail to mention, further, another thinker whose importance was crucial for the development of the Socratic-Platonic doctrine: Pythagoras.
When referring to the study of Ethics in Ancient Greece, it is difficult not to mention the Pythagorean School, since its master, famous for the rigor and discipline he demanded of his disciples, had a very well-defined moral code, as can be seen in his Golden Verses, which comprise a set of maxims for the pursuit of purification through an ethical life:
The aim of Pythagoras's doctrine was to enlighten human beings, purify them of their vices, free them from their errors and lead them back to virtue, to truth; and after having made them pass through all the degrees of understanding and intelligence, to make them similar to the immortal gods. (Fabre d’Olivet, 2017, p. 45)
Furthermore:
This philosopher had, in view of this, divided his doctrine into two parts: the purifying part and the unifying part. Through the first, the human being purified himself of his stains, emerged from the darkness of ignorance and attained virtue; through the second, he employed his acquired virtue to unite himself with the divinity, through which he arrived at perfection. (Fabre d’Olivet, 2017, p. 45)
Thus, it is possible to observe a maturation of the investigation of the ethical problem, in a movement that goes beyond the desire to highlight the conduct of the excellent men of the past in order to use them as examples, and begins to attempt to propose knowledge of a more or less technical order.
However, it can be said that the study of the ethical problem in a properly philosophical manner takes shape only with the appearance of Socrates. It is from this thinker, who left nothing written to posterity, that philosophy takes on a decidedly humanist character, that is, it breaks with those who would later be called pre-Socratics – who were, for the most part, focused on the study of nature (physis) – and begins to investigate man himself as an acting element inserted in this same nature.
However, everything that is known about Socrates has been handed down to us through his disciples, among whom we can highlight the figure of Plato.
Plato's works – with the exception of a few writings – consist basically of dialogues between characters in which Socrates almost always appears as the protagonist. The difficulty of making a reliable separation between what belongs to the master or to his disciple is thus evident, and, therefore, it would not be wrong to state that this is a doctrine – as well as an ethics – that is, so to speak, Socratic-Platonic.
In these dialogues of Plato, one can effectively observe the transformation and consolidation of two aspects. First, of the investigative method, which becomes dialectical in nature, that is, the discovery and contrasting of argumentative premises in order to arrive at some reasonable or plausible conclusion. Second, of the objects of study. That is, it no longer aims at exalting the great deeds of the past or at proposing synthetic maxims for attaining a good life, but there arises a concern with the discovery of universally valid definitions.
The objective, from now on, becomes the moving away from the particular fact or being toward a consequent elaboration of knowledge of a universal character. It is no longer a matter of trying to demonstrate which men were just or courageous, at what moment and in what way, for example, but rather of reaching a definition of Justice itself and of Courage itself – concepts which are precisely those that make it possible for particular beings to be classified, or not, as such.
It is observed that a large part of the Platonic work can be regarded, especially in its early and middle phases, as an investigation of Ethics, proposing and delimiting concepts that refer to human behavior and that are intended to be universal and immutable. It is also observed that Ethics will be understood as a kind of science of the virtues and, this being so, the notions of Ethics and Virtue studied will be essentially united.
That is, it can be stated that the discussion of Ethics only gains traction with the emergence of Socrates and the writings of Plato. Although the latter still makes considerable use of a mythical-poetic language, the reader must go beyond this surface to grasp his message, which is always subordinated to the desire to attain knowledge that is universal, immutable and eternal. The idea begins to be built that, in fact, good and evil exist, that they are independent of the perception of others and that, therefore, they are not relative. Man, in this way, begins to see the possibility of an objective judgment of his actions, being able to conclude which of them are universally better or worse, which, in the end, will determine what kind of man he himself will be – of an excellent lineage, or of low worth.
We finally arrive at the one who is chiefly responsible for systematizing the study of Ethics in a properly scientific manner, that is, who seeks to propose its foundations categorically and analytically. Unlike what is observed in Plato, where the intention was to approximate a reasonable proposition on the subject in question, the aim now becomes the discovery of scientific knowledge.
When one speaks of Aristotle, the investigation of Ethics takes on an ontological aspect. The problem becomes knowing what determines human nature, that is, which set of qualities and attributes is necessary for recognizing the existence of man as such and which, in this way, characterize his potencies and limitations:
Would we be entitled to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have certain functions or occupations, the human being as such has not a single one and is not, by nature, destined to perform any function? Should we not, on the contrary, suppose that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and each of the members conspicuously have a function of their own, in the same way the human being likewise has a function that surpasses all the functions of his members? (Aristóteles, 2014, p. 59, 1097b22–1098a3)
To discover the function of the human being, in other words, represents the discovery of what is imprinted, a priori, on his human condition, that is, of what is previously determined by nature and is common to all members of the species. Only on the basis of this knowledge could propositions be established about what would make this same man a member of the human species of superior or inferior lineage:
Even plants prove to be partakers of life, whereas we are seeking the peculiar function of the human being. In view of this, we must set aside life from the standpoint of nutrition and growth. Next, we have sentient life, but this, likewise, seems to be shared by horses, oxen and all animals. There remains, then, the active life of reason. (Aristóteles, 2014, p. 59, 1097b22–1098a3)
The philosopher draws a parallel between man and other living beings and discovers that, in fact, all have certain aspects in common. However, he also concludes that there is, among these qualities, one that distinguishes the human being from all the rest, one that is especially peculiar to him and that, therefore, is chiefly responsible for his differentiation from the rest of nature: his rationality.
Rationality, among other things, involves the capacity to deliberate, that is, being able, in the face of a series of possibilities, to reflect on and select the path one wishes to follow based on some criterion. Man, in this way, being endowed with the capacity to choose, comes to fit into a context that is not applicable to other animals. The animal that does not possess the faculty of reason is determined to be as it is, that is, it cannot be different from what its nature prescribes for it and, thus, it can be said that it will be entirely what it must be, since it cannot be otherwise. Man, in turn, has this faculty that makes him distinct – his rationality – but, unlike other animals, he is not determined to use it; that is, although rationality exists as potency, it is not always realized as act, and it may lie dormant for a great part of the time. At such a moment – that is, when reason is in the background – man continues to be the active principle of his movement, since he cannot act outside his unity of being – or of his soul, as will be discussed later – yet he comes to be guided not by the part that is peculiar and superior to him, but by those that make him resemble the rest of living beings. At this moment, man participates less in his humanity – that is, in the formal principle that distinguishes him – and is thus guided by his inferior parts.
Furthermore:
If, then, the function of the human being is the exercise of the faculties of the soul in conformity with reason or not dissociated from reason, and if we recognize the function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class as generically the same, the qualification of the latter's superiority in excellence being added to the function – if this is so, and if we affirm that the function of the human being is a certain way of living constituted as the exercise of the faculties and activities of the soul in accordance with reason, and the function of a good man is to perform them well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own excellence, in that case it follows that the human good is the activity of the faculties of the soul in conformity with virtue or, if there is more than one, in conformity with the best and most complete of them. (Aristóteles, 2014, pp. 59–60, 1098a5–1098b15)
In this passage, Aristotle proposes that the function of something is what determines its nature; and, given that the function of man is to live in accordance with his rational faculties, it follows that man is better in proportion to his capacity to subordinate his actions to the scrutiny of reason. And, now, since virtue is that which, by definition, points toward the Good – and, therefore, toward what is better and superior – it is also concluded that virtue is the rational act par excellence. That is, man, whenever he makes use of his rational faculties, seeking to carry them to their ultimate consequences, will inevitably come upon the virtuous act, the one that is supremely good and, therefore, superior to all others.
It should also be noted that, for Aristotle, political science is that to which all the other human sciences are subordinated, as it is the master science that unifies the pólis. Thus, it is observed that Ethics falls into this category, since it is a science that manifests itself politically. This being so, it needs the pólis in order to exist.
Now, (1) if man only realizes himself as such through the full use of his rational faculties; (2) if these faculties inevitably lead to the practice of Virtue; (3) if Virtue is the object of investigation of Ethics; and (4) if Ethics is a Political Science; then it follows that man only attains his humanity as an integral member of the pólis, that is, that he needs this ecosystem of shared life in order to be good. The pólis, therefore, allows and creates the conditions for man to actualize his potency for excellence.
With these points about Ethics clarified, it is possible to proceed to its deeper treatment in Platonic doctrine, more specifically in the work that guides this study.
2.3 THE REPUBLIC
Having provided the preceding context, the intention now is to delve into the Platonic work proper.
First, a brief biography of Plato will be presented, in order to further contribute to the understanding of his writings. Next, we will enter into the dialogue that underpins this work, with a general exposition of the work's theme. Then, the Theory of Forms and its relationship with the Allegory of the Cave, present in the Republic, will be analyzed. Afterward, the tripartition of the soul according to Platonic doctrine and its relationship with the classes that make up the city will be discussed and, finally, the forms of government.
2.3.1 PLATO
Aristocles, better known as Plato, was born around 428/427 B.C., in the midst of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), a great conflict that took place in the region of Greece between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta. It was a war aimed above all at conquering hegemony over the region, in which the two most influential city-states of the time came to confront each other. Plato thus had the opportunity to observe, during his youth, both the process of the collapse of Athenian democracy and the institution of the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, in 404 B.C., as well as the return of democracy in 403 B.C.
Plato came from an influential family and received a good education. Thus, because of his aristocratic descent, he would probably have pursued a political career in Athens. However, everything changed when, around 407 B.C., he encountered Socrates, who had been a hero of the Peloponnesian War and was renowned for his great wisdom, making a profound impact on the young Plato.
From then on, Plato drew close to Socrates and remained so until the moment when the latter was tried and condemned to death by Athenian democracy, in 399 B.C., accused of the crimes of corrupting the youth and disrespecting the gods. This event had great repercussions in Plato's life; he came to disdain the possibility that democracy could produce any kind of justice, and it led him to write the first of his dialogues, the Apology of Socrates, in which he narrates the moment of his master's trial.
In the following decade, Plato actually began his career as a writer, projecting, mainly in these first works, the ideas he had observed and learned directly from Socrates. In this phase, it is possible to observe, in dialogues such as Crito, Euthyphro, Ion and Laches, a philosophical proposal which, although it started from the Socratic methodology, was still quite rudimentary, often ending in aporias, that is, without presenting a solution to the problem raised.
Disillusioned with Athenian democracy, Plato decided, in 388 B.C., to go to Syracuse, a city on the east of the island of Sicily, in Magna Graecia, with the intention of trying to put into practice the philosophical knowledge he had been developing. On this occasion, he drew close to the tyrant Dionysius I, in an attempt to influence him with the idea of the philosopher-king, a thesis he would later develop in greater depth in his work The Republic. However, the relationship between the two became troubled and Dionysius I had Plato arrested; he was sold as a slave and, fortunately, bought by one of his disciples, thus being able to return to Athens.
Back in Athens, Plato, in 387 B.C., founded the Academy, an educational institution devoted to philosophy, and finally gave real momentum to the production of his works.
In this new phase, one can highlight what became known as the “second voyage” (deuteros plous):
At first, Plato dealt with a predominantly ethical (ethical-political) set of problems, moving precisely from the position that belonged to Socrates. Then he realizes the need to recover the concerns of the philosophy of physis. But the recovery of the onto-cosmological elements of the physicists is carried out in a profoundly original way and, indeed, through an authentic revolution of thought, which Plato himself called the “second voyage”, the voyage that led him to the discovery of the suprasensible (of supraphysical being). (Reale, 2022, p. 22)
At this moment, Plato moves away from the naturalist philosophers – who represented the “first voyage” – and sets out on an investigation that sought to go beyond the answers they had proposed. From then on, the concern becomes the search to know things in themselves and, to this end, the investigation is transposed to the ontological – and therefore metaphysical – plane. Now, if man can look at a particular flower and recognize it as beautiful, just as he can observe a cat and apprehend it as bearing this same quality, what would this “adornment” be that, when added to the particular being, makes it knowable in this way? For Plato, this would be the Beautiful in itself, which is independent of its particular manifestations in sensible experience. Moreover, if this Beautiful exists (since its manifestation is recognized through the beauty perceived in beings) and yet cannot be seen or touched – that is, it lies beyond the senses – then there must necessarily be a kind of “other reality” that encompasses its existence. Thus the first steps are taken in the study of Metaphysics, which, within the Platonic perspective, will lead to the formulation of the Theory of Ideas.
It should also be noted that Plato himself, in his famous Seventh Letter, made it clear that not all of his philosophy was set out in his writings. According to the philosopher, the most important parts were left for oral teaching, in his unwritten doctrines, the so-called ágrapha dógmata, which only reached posterity through an indirect tradition:
Today, many take for granted the existence of two communicative traditions in Plato: a “direct” one (drawn from his famous dialogues and letters) and an “indirect” one, recorded by some of his disciples and by later philosophers. However, unlike what seems to occur with practically all other ancient thinkers, whose philosophies were externally recorded (recorded by other thinkers), Plato's “indirect tradition” is not merely a doxographic compilation whose aim is to deal exclusively with content already set out in his texts: it is also a catalogue of testimonies and commentaries on a doctrine reserved for oral lessons – which Aristotle refers to as the “unwritten doctrines” (ágrapha dógmata) – supposedly discussed and refined by Plato and his disciples within the Academy and not recorded in his texts. (Xavier, 2022, p. 16)
Having clarified these points about the persona of the author who provides the theoretical foundation for this analysis, it is possible to delve into what is by consensus considered his masterpiece, the dialogue The Republic.
2.3.2 POLITEIA
Entering specifically into the work that underpins this study, it is appropriate, first, to set out the general intention of its author.
The Republic, like the other Platonic dialogues, seeks, through the dialectical process promoted by its protagonist, Socrates, to approach the definition of a concept as such; that is, it seeks, through dialogue, to know – as far as possible – the universal propositions that reside in the multiplicity of particular beings recognized as being of the same nature. That is, what really matters, by way of conclusion, is to establish a definition that characterizes and delimits what the thing investigated must be. And in this case, it will be an investigation of the concept of Justice.
The work begins with a survey of various opinions about this virtue, and Socrates, through his method of questions and answers, keeps refuting them one by one, demonstrating their weaknesses and contradictions. Socrates, however, recognizes the difficulty of defining a term of such great complexity and observes the following:
The investigation we are undertaking is not easy and requires keen sight. So, since we are not shrewd individuals, I think we should adopt the method of investigation we would employ if, lacking keen sight, we were told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. (Platão, 2019, p. 96, 368c–d)
Thus, he proposes a solution:
Do we not say that there is the justice of one man and also that of a whole State? “Certainly.” And is a State larger than a man? “It is larger.” Then perhaps there is more justice in the larger thing, and in it it is easier to discover what it is. So, if you agree, let us first discover what it is in a city or State, after which we shall look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is analogous to the larger. (Platão, 2019, p. 96, 368e–369a)
In this passage, it is observed that, in view of the difficulty of carrying out an investigation of the Justice present in a single man, Socrates proposes a strategy in which, starting from the premise that this virtue is one and, therefore, essentially the same in all its manifestations, it would be easier to analyze it in a context where it could be perceived in greater proportions and, for this reason, he suggests that this process be carried out through a study of the city:
If, therefore, “I said”, we could observe the generation or formation of a State in theory, would we not also see the generation of its justice, as well as that of its injustice? (Platão, 2019, p. 97, 369a)
It is at this moment that the relationship between the work and the investigation into the generation of the ideal city is established. That is, the dialogue does not arise as a political treatise for the modification of the social order; the relationship of the Republic to the elaboration of a model of the city is, so to speak, methodological.
However, this consideration does not diminish the value of what is portrayed in the structuring of this city. What is important to emphasize from the outset, however, is that the city does not exist in isolation as such, that is, there is no concept of the pólis separate from the parts that constitute it, that is, from its members or citizens. The existence of the pólis demands a concentration of men living together in community. Without man, there is no pólis, and, therefore, the nature of the latter is directly conditioned by the nature of the former. The pólis will be, according to this perspective, the image of the individuals who compose it.
Thus, to speak of the pólis is to speak of man, and vice versa. And so, when this imaginary construction of the ideal city begins, what is done, ultimately, is to discourse on the ideal nature of this same man.
Now, it should also be noted that, for Plato, there is an element that gives man the unity of his being. That is, it is noticeable that man is made up of parts that are dissimilar to one another. Evidence of this is found when, for example, one has the will to do something but decides to do something else. The will and the deliberative element observed in this case are part of the same individual, yet they point in opposite directions. For example, a man may feel the desire to eat a chocolate, but remember that he is following a nutritional diet and, therefore, decide not to consume this food. This decision does not cancel the previous desire; it only places it under the dominion of a criterion to be followed. The same can be perceived when, after receiving an insult, a man becomes angry, feels impelled to attack the person speaking to him and, even so, decides not to do so.
In these two examples, it is possible to see that a rational faculty imposes itself in both situations. In the first case, an appetitive part of that man – or the part that desires – wanted to eat the chocolate; and, in the second, an irascible part wanted to resort to violence. In this brief analysis, one notes, from the outset, the existence of three component parts of the individual, which will be duly analyzed further on. What matters now is the following reflection: if man is composed of parts, but does not for that reason cease, at any moment, to be the same man, there must be some element, as mentioned above, that gives him unity, that unifies his being, that is, that integrates all these parts and constitutes him as one. For Plato, this element is his soul, which can be synthetically defined as “a conglomerate of diverse tendencies more or less coordinated by a common principle” (Consentino, 2008).
In short, it can be said that man becomes what is projected from the parts of his soul. It is the soul that, according to the greater or lesser participation of each of these parts, will determine each type of man.
We concluded earlier that the city is according to the men who make it up, and these are according to their souls. It is reasonable to state, therefore, that the pólis, being precisely a grouping of souls, will manifest itself according to their nature. This being so, to speak of the city is ultimately to speak of the human soul, and in this structuring of the ideal city, the ideal soul will inevitably also be set forth.
2.3.3 THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE THEORY OF FORMS
In general terms, in order to understand the Platonic work, it is necessary to grasp what is the backbone of all his philosophy, the theory that runs through practically all his dialogues and reaches its highest point of clarity in the Republic. This is, then, the Theory of Forms or Theory of Ideas.
Plato, on many occasions in his works, was accustomed to using allegories to develop themes involving high abstraction and, in this way, sought to present his most fundamental philosophical concepts to the reader by means of this symbolic language. Thus, at the beginning of Book Seven of the Republic, using this device, the author begins the exposition of what became known as the Allegory of the Cave:
[…] imagine human beings dwelling in a kind of underground cave, with a long entrance above open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They have been there since childhood, immobilized in the same place, with legs and necks in fetters preventing them from turning their heads. Imagine also the light of a fire burning some distance away at a higher point and behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners a path above. Imagine that a low wall has been built along this path, like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they display their puppets. (Platão, 2019, p. 323, 514a–b)
And he continues:
Then see also that along the wall people carry all kinds of artifacts that are raised above the level of the wall: statues of human beings and of other animals, made of stone, wood and every material. And, as one would suppose, some of these carriers talk, while others are silent. (Platão, 2019, p. 323, 514c–515a)
In this way, Plato paints the spatial picture of the Allegory of the Cave. There are prisoners, who are prevented from moving their heads, looking at a wall in front of them. Behind these prisoners, there are other men who, using the light of a fire, project shadows of various artifacts onto this wall, while talking and/or making certain sounds.
Next, further:
Do you suppose, in the first place, that these individuals see anything of themselves and of one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall of the cave in front of them?
[…]
Consequently, the prisoners would believe completely that the real would be nothing other than the shadows of these artifacts. (Platão, 2019, p. 324, 515a–c)
Now, what is gathered from these first passages is that the prisoners, knowing nothing beyond these shadows and the echoes that spread through the cave, would tend to believe that what surrounded them encompassed all possible reality. It is thus observed that the senses – in this case, sight and hearing – are not sufficient for the contemplation of truth as such, that is, the assimilation of what is sensibly perceived does not provide enough information to arrive at a reliable conclusion. Taking this idea to its ultimate consequences, one can conclude that the sensible world – or world of the senses – which is the one in which man is immersed in his material experience, does not contain complete information about that which is; in some cases, it may even be in accordance with the truth, but it will not be able to provide more than a true opinion, since some element that would ratify any assertion will always escape it.
Plato continues:
Consider, then, what the release from these chains and the cure of this folly would be like if something of this kind naturally happened: when one of them was freed and suddenly forced to stand up, turn his neck and walk and – raising his eyes – look at the light, he would feel pain from the dazzling of his sight and would be unable to see the things whose shadows he had seen before. What do you think he would say if he were told that what he had seen before was all nonsense, but that now, being closer to reality and turned toward more real things, he sees more correctly? (Platão, 2019, p. 324, 515d)
In this passage, the author's intention is clear: to demonstrate that the process of the prisoner's liberation involves an intellectual effort to leave the world of opinion, that is, the world involving individual human perception – as when he observes the shadows on the cave wall – for the contemplation of things in themselves. It is a movement of abandoning the subjectivity of the subject for the objectivity of Being.
The prisoner, on freeing himself from the chains, begins to perceive the cause of what had previously been apprehended on the wall and thus realizes that the shadow was not the cause of itself, but was manifested only in accordance with what was projected from behind. Therefore, for there to be a shadow – or sensible perception – there must previously have been the object that would be exposed to the light.
In short, one understands from this allegory that man naturally leans toward an overvaluation of the senses, since, being information that is immediately apprehended and requires little processing, it can lead to the belief that it encompasses reality as a whole. However, sensory perception concerns the one who senses, not the thing sensed, and this opinion can never constitute knowledge. Although the information captured is, without a doubt, the gateway to the elaboration of this knowledge – given that everything man perceives in the world he perceives through his senses – it must still be submitted to another stage, in which it will pass through the scrutiny of the rational and intellective apparatus of this same man.
Next, having received information from the environment that surrounds him, man is able to make a cognitive effort, by means of his intelligence, in order to know the thing in itself, that is, to know what is essential in what was perceived, to grasp intellectually the universality present in individuality. When this exercise is carried out, the individual realizes that there is an essence that is peculiar to what is being individually apprehended and that encompasses all other beings of this same nature. The set of these universal attributes in which the particular object observed participates, and which apply to all other beings also perceived as being of the same nature, represents what Plato considers its ideal Form. That is, according to this perspective, for an object to be able to manifest itself individually and sensibly – that is, in the sensible world – there must first be the necessary conditions that make its existence possible and that allow, ultimately, this something to be one thing and not another. In other words, the individual sensible being participates in this ideal form, which dwells in the intelligible world – or outside the cave.
Going further, it is concluded that all sensible reality is, ultimately, participating in this intelligible reality, which encompasses all the ideal Forms of what is capable of coming-to-be, without ever being able to contain it completely, since, while the sensible is in constant motion – owing to its non-permanent nature, subject to becoming – the intelligible is fundamentally eternal and immutable.
The importance of understanding the Allegory of the Cave – and, consequently, the Theory of Forms – for this work lies in the fact that it can be understood as a compendium of the Platonic epistemological view and, thus, it is through it that it becomes possible to understand how this philosopher saw the possibility of knowledge.
In a first layer are the representations or copies of what exists physically – when one takes a photo or draws something, for example – and the sensible beings themselves, that is, those that can be captured by the senses and that are capable of being represented in images. At this level, man is not capable of producing anything beyond an opinion about what is around him. That is, although he perceives and processes this information from the environment, because it rests on something that is in constant motion – or transformation – it becomes difficult to produce assertions that hold any reliability, since this unitary being that is perceived is, with each passing moment, already different from what it was the moment before. In order to be able to state that something is what it is or that it has ceased to be something, one must be able to rely on immutable information about what this something is, as well as what it is not. All this so that this statement can always be identical to itself, representing, in the end, the very definition of knowledge, which comes to manifest itself in the next layer.
At this next level, man advances beyond his sensory perceptions and, through the use of his rational faculties, begins to grasp intellectually the nature of the being that reveals itself ontically. This is the moment when this man “leaves the cave” and begins to contemplate the Forms as such, which represent the intelligible possibilities of what is capable of coming to be. It is at this point that man begins to “see” the essential characteristics that unite all beings of the same nature – characteristics that are timeless and “non-spatial” and, therefore, not subject to becoming, to transformation and, thus, to destruction. That is, one comes into possession of information that is universal, immutable and eternal, always identical to itself; one thus lives the experience of truth through the contemplation of knowledge itself.
All this is relevant because it supports the debate on Ethics carried out in the dialogue of the Republic. It is precisely because knowledge exists that the debate on virtue cannot lead to relativist conclusions.
The virtuous act evidently manifests itself in the sensible sphere and, in the same way as set out above, has its ideal Form that defines and delimits it. When it comes to be ontically in the sensible, like all other things, it manifests itself by participating in this Form – which, as has already been shown, is universal, immutable and eternal. Thus, both the intelligible form of virtue and the correct apprehension of some conduct classified as such – in the sensible world – are not subject to the impermanence of opinion. Virtue is the Form of the virtuous act, and what is perceived individually ultimately either is or is not virtue, so that this conclusion can only be reached by man through the use of his rational and intellective faculties. In other words, through his ascending movement toward the “exit from the cave”.
This reasoning serves to show that when one discusses Virtue Ethics in the ideal pólis, one seeks to produce something that moves away from sensible opinion and is in accordance with its intelligible aspect, which has truth value and, therefore, represents genuine knowledge.
2.3.4 THE CLASSES OF THE CITY, THE TRIPARTITION OF THE SOUL AND THEIR VIRTUES
In the previous chapter, what is considered the fundamental axis of Platonic doctrine was presented: the Theory of Ideas, which runs, explicitly or implicitly, to a greater or lesser degree, through his entire work. By means of this Theory, Plato ultimately sought to present a solution that would illuminate and describe the existing tension (1) between unity and multiplicity, (2) between rest and motion, (3) between the essential and the accidental and, finally, (4) between being and non-being.
Looking at the world, the philosopher perceives that the various beings, even though each exists individually, are nonetheless capable of being classified as participants in the same nature; that is, from observing the multiplicity of objects belonging to the same class, he grasps that there is an essence that gives them unity and guarantees their recognition as a given thing and not another. For example, when a group of cats is gathered, although they are distinct – or multiple – beings, all can ultimately be perceived as “cat”. That is, there is something present in all of them that gives them a certain unity (1). Moreover, he also perceives that reality is subject to constant motion, that becoming never ceases to come to be and that, thus, everything that exists is always becoming, to some extent, something new in relation to what it was the instant before. However, although motion does not stop, beings can still, at each moment, be perceived as what they are, that is, they do not change completely, since, if that were the case, this change would not even be knowable. That is, it is observed that, amid the constant flow of becoming, there is an element of permanence that is sustained in beings, guaranteeing their recognition as a concrete individual being that presents itself in a certain way in reality (2).
Plato also indicates that, among individual beings, there are certain characteristics that are proper to them and necessary for these same beings to be classified in a certain way. That is, in a logic similar to that presented in the unity-multiplicity interaction, at this point one apprehends the existence of certain requirements that make up and determine this notion of unity. These are the essential elements that run through the multiplicity of beings understood as being of the same form, and that end up establishing, in fact, what the thing is. These essential properties always appear, in individual beings, accompanied by other accidental elements, which are responsible for allowing the differentiation between objects, but which, ultimately, are not decisive for their being apprehended as of a certain form (3).
Finally, the tension between being and non-being appears in the fact that, although the concrete individual being is characterized as being of a certain form, it does not wholly represent what it is, but only participates in its archetypal model. That is, it is understood and even called metonymically according to its form, but only for convenience, since it is not this form taken in itself, given that this object, like all others similar to it, only comes to be as its participant. That is, it is as if this being were and were not at the same time, since it participates in and is what it is, but not completely and only for a determined time, for it soon dissolves into becoming (4).
The solution to all these reflections raised above lies in the structures “inhabiting” the Platonic intelligible world: the eternal Ideas (or Forms). These, for Plato, are the evidence that concrete individual beings do not hold within themselves the possibilities that condition them, that is, that these beings only come to be as they are because they respect the eidetic schemes that sustain them. It is deduced, therefore, that the universal schemes that guarantee particular manifestations in the sensible world exist, first of all, in themselves and, this being so, hold within themselves the properties of what they are. Thus, any attempt at a relativist interpretation of these forms is ruled out, since they are already determined by an a priori nature, that is, one that exists prior to and independently of the way in which the being that participates in it manifests itself and is sensibly perceived. The individual being, in this way, is according to the scheme that conditions it and nothing more, and it falls to the observer to be able to grasp, by means of his intelligence, what truly presents itself.
In short, it follows that everything that is has a certain nature proper to it, which is conditioned by the universal scheme that makes it possible. What remains for man, in order to know, is to seek the contemplation – through a cognitive effort – of this universal and intelligible nature that subsists in sensible multiplicity.
Understanding these developments is of utmost importance, since they are directly related to the elaboration of the proposal of the ideal city that will be made in the Republic. As the name itself indicates, the city presented in this work belongs to the category of ideas, of the immaterial or transcendent, and is therefore not a treatise on political organization aimed at its implementation. This city presents itself as a principle, a model, a paradigm, something that can be used as a reference for existing political communities, but which, like the intelligible Form of all other things, can never materialize in its entirety, but only in schemes of greater or lesser participation:
Nevertheless, his [Plato's] ideal society would serve as a model and a standard of comparison for assessing the concrete conditions of real society. Once a model of perfection is in view, it would be possible to measure the state of health or sickness of a given community by its proximity to or distance from it, and perhaps prescribe a remedy for it. Indeed, as one reads the book [The Republic], it is striking how little Socrates, the protagonist, concerns himself with normative and institutional questions. His concern was to establish the fundamental principles that should sustain and guide a human society as a whole. (Consentino, 2008)
It should also be emphasized that Plato starts from the premise that the city, even when taken as one, is nonetheless composed of parts, which ultimately determine its nature. These parts are nothing less than the individuals who compose it. These, in turn, are composed of body and soul: the former taken as the rigid, sensible, material structure that acts in reality, in the physis; the latter understood as the moving principle of this movement.
It is thus understood that the nature of the city is conditioned by the nature of its citizens, and these are conditioned by the nature of their souls. In this way, for Plato, an isomorphic relationship between soul and city becomes evident and, therefore, when one discusses one, one naturally speaks of the other as well.
Having laid down this condition, the Greek philosopher, in seeking to know the human soul – which is invisible, immaterial and therefore difficult to approach – decides to adopt a strategy aimed at analyzing the city, hoping, by establishing its foundations, to come upon the foundations of the former. It is within this context that the investigation into the structure of the ideal city begins in the Republic.
The configuration of this city, therefore, does not represent an idealization of the philosopher's mind, but an investigative effort to discover the perfect formal structure of political organization, which will be nothing more than a large-scale projection of the harmoniously ordered human soul. That is, the image of the city that is gradually painted in the Republic should not be seen as the fruit of a specific ideology or worldview – which would naturally bring it closer to the so-called doxa, or opinion – intended to modify reality, but, on the contrary, is the result of a philosophical exercise that seeks to know the thing as it presents itself – that is, that seeks episteme.
This understanding is extremely important because, in listing the classes of the city, Plato is looking at reality and trying to understand it, and not looking within himself and elaborating what would best conform to his supposed personal beliefs.
The same applies to the analysis of the virtues that will be listed as proper to each of the classes of the city. The starting premise is that these virtues exist in themselves as ideal forms and can therefore be known. It is not an attempt to propose what would supposedly be good for the man of the pólis, but rather to attain knowledge of what is proper to human nature and what, unfailingly, ennobles it. By knowing the universal definition of the virtues, man becomes capable of practicing the virtuous act, that is, the one that participates – in the sensible world – in the eternal form of its corresponding virtue – which “dwells” in the intelligible world.
Thus, it must be understood that this Platonic construction is intended to rest on absolute – that is, non-relative – terms, which, evidently, although open to criticism, do not qualify as a propositional presentation, but as one of a descriptive character.
In the genesis of the city, Plato sets out the following regarding the first class:
“I think a State comes into existence because none of us is self-sufficient; all need many things. Do you think the creation of a State is founded on any other principle?” “No.” “And because people need many things, and because one person turns to a second because of one need and to a third because of another need, many people gather in a single place as partners and helpers. And to this dwelling for life in common we give the name of city or State, do we not?” “We do.” “And if they share things among themselves, giving and receiving, they do so because each believes this is better for himself.” “Certainly.” “Then,” I said, “let us create a State in theory from the beginning. Its true creator, it seems, will be our needs.” “Obviously.” “I believe our first and greatest need will be to provide food in order to preserve life.” “Most certainly.” “The second need will be shelter and the third clothing and similar things.” “That is right.” “How, then, will a State be able to provide all this? Will it not be necessary for one person to be a farmer, another a builder, and a third a weaver? And should we not add the shoemaker and someone else who takes care of the needs of the body?” “Certainly.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 97–98, 369b–d)
That is, the city begins to organize itself because men see, in a utilitarian way, that they have a better chance of survival when they are together, since they can cooperate with one another through a division of labor.
It is observed, therefore, that this first class arises with the purpose of satisfying a primitive survival instinct, guaranteeing the basic conditions so that man can then begin to occupy himself with other activities that are, so to speak, physiologically non-essential.
Analogously, the same applies to the human soul. This class refers to the part of the soul that concerns the physical demands necessary for man to be able to exist, which reside in the peculiarities proper to the body. Indeed, these are the needs relating to nutrition, sleep and sex (as reproductive activity). Thus, this part of the soul is attributed the quality of being concupiscent or appetitive.
Without the effective satisfaction of these three factors, man's existence becomes ontologically impossible, since, being essentially related to his very nature, he cannot separate himself from them. Without food and without sleep, man perishes; without reproductive activity, man does not even come to be:
The first of these categories corresponds to man's fundamental condition as a living being. As such, together with all other living beings, he is driven by a powerful natural instinct both for the preservation of his own life and for the preservation of the life of his species. The first is called the survival instinct, which is subjectively experienced as a desire for food. The second, which induces him to the distribution and perpetuation of his genes, is called the reproductive instinct and is subjectively experienced as a desire for sex. These two are the most manifestly common and immediate desires not only for animals, but for all human beings. (Consentino, 2008)
Thus, it is clear that the virtue proper to this class of artisans and farmers – as well as to this part of the soul – must involve a capacity to establish a just measure in the satisfaction of the needs set out above. That is, if these are lacking to man, as already stated, he ceases to exist; however, the unrestrained enjoyment of these goods necessary for subsistence is also harmful to him, causing him physiological harm, as well as making him hostage to his most immediate and animal desires, preventing his access to higher goods. This is, then, the virtue of Moderation, which “indeed seems to be the virtue of the irrational parts”, which constitutes “the mean with regard to pleasures”, with “intemperance appearing in the same sphere” (Aristóteles, 2014). Furthermore:
Moderation and intemperance, therefore, have to do with the pleasures that the human being shares with the other animals and that consequently appear base and bestial. These are those of touch and taste. But even taste seems to be of little importance, if any, as regards moderation; indeed, taste has to do with the distinction of flavors, as practiced by wine tasters and cooks who add seasonings when preparing tasty dishes; but this is not what they derive pleasure from, or, for all intents and purposes, this is not the case of the intemperate man; it is really the enjoyment of the object that is pleasurable, which is invariably exclusive to touch, equally in eating and drinking and in what are classified as the pleasures of sex.
[…]
The conclusion is that the sense to which intemperance is bound is the most common of the senses. And there seem to be good reasons for the bad reputation it has, because it concerns us not as human beings, but as animals. Thus, to enjoy these pleasures and to prefer them reveals our bestial side. (Aristóteles, 2014, pp. 136–137, 1118a20–1119a5)
In this way, it is observed that for the class of artisans and farmers to be harmoniously integrated into the pólis, its members need to be conformed to the virtue of Moderation, being capable of prudently measuring the enjoyment of the goods inherent to bodily subsistence.
Advancing in the structuring of the ideal city, Plato sees the need for a class that is especially responsible for providing the security of the community. This class will initially be named that of the guardians, but will then be corrected to auxiliaries of the guardians, since the former will later be regarded as the rulers themselves:
“We will not state, for the time being,” I said, “whether the effects of war are bad or good, but only that we have also discovered the origin of war. This origin is those same desires which are, for the most part, responsible for the bad things that befall States and the individuals in them.” “Certainly.” “Consequently, my friend, the State will have to undergo a further enlargement, and not precisely by a small contingent of people, but by the number of members of a whole army, which will fight the invaders in defense of all the wealth of the State and of all the other things we have mentioned.” “And would the citizens themselves not suffice for this task?” he said. “They would not suffice if the agreement we reached when we began to form our State remains valid, for we certainly agreed – as you well remember – that it is impossible for a single person to practice many arts or professions well.” “What you say is true.” “Do you not think that fighting in war is a trade or profession?” “Of course I do.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 105–106, 373e–374b)
Having understood why the class of the auxiliaries of the guardians needs to exist, it becomes evident that the virtue proper to it must necessarily involve the capacity to face physically whatever adversities arise:
“Do you think,” I said, “that, as regards guarding, there would be any difference between a well-bred young dog and a young man of good family?” “What do you mean?” “Well, both need keen perception, speed to catch what they spot, and strength if it is necessary to fight against what they have caught.” “Indeed, both need all these things.” “And both must be courageous if they are really to fight well?” “Of course.” “And will a horse, a dog or any other animal be courageous if it is not endowed with spirit? Or have you not noticed how invincible and unbeatable spirit is, so much so that its presence makes the whole soul fearless and unconquerable?” (Platão, 2019, p. 108, 375a–b)
It is observed, therefore, that the virtue of Courage is inseparable from spiritedness, that is, from readiness and boldness in the face of danger. However, this capacity, taken in isolation, can be dangerous to the constitution of the pólis itself, since, when invoked without due moral guidance, it may become a kind of brutality. Thus, one sees the need to temper the disposition of the auxiliaries with some gentleness, which will allow the members of this class to direct their aggressiveness at the right targets in the right situations:
“But if they possess such natures, Glaucon, will they not be savage toward one another and toward the rest of the citizens?” “By Zeus! It will be difficult for them not to be so.” “And yet they will certainly have to be gentle with their fellow countrymen and harsh and cruel with the enemy. If they are not, they will not even wait for the enemy to arrive and destroy the State, but will themselves be the first to destroy it.” “That is true.” (Platão, 2019, p. 108, 375b–c)
The auxiliary, therefore, must possess the capacity to discern between those who must be defended and those who must be attacked. The resource that allows correct discernment between things is precisely knowledge. Thus, these auxiliaries, in order to be complete, must also contain within themselves some love of wisdom:
“When a dog sees someone it does not know, it becomes angry before suffering any harm. But when it knows the person, it welcomes him, even if it has never received anything good from that person. Has this never surprised you?” “I have certainly never paid attention to it, although it is obvious that this is how a dog behaves.” “But it is certainly a refined trait of its emotional nature and shows a true philosopher.” “In what sense?” “In the sense that it distinguishes in everything and in every individual it sees a friend or an enemy on the sole basis of knowing the former and not knowing the latter. How can one deny love of knowledge to a creature that defines what is familiar and friendly to it and what is strange and hostile according to knowledge and ignorance?” “There is no denying it.” “But surely the lover of knowledge and the lover of wisdom are the same?” “Indeed, the same.” “That being so, can we not confidently suppose, in the case of a human being too, that if he is to be gentle with his own and with those he knows, he will have to be by nature a lover of wisdom and a lover of knowledge?” “We can.” “Love of wisdom, spirit, speed and strength must, therefore, for us be combined in the nature of anyone who is destined to be a good and genuine guardian of our State.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 109–110, 376a–c)
Thus, the auxiliary must be, to some extent, a philosopher, understood as a genuine lover of wisdom.
This being established, Plato then proposes the pedagogical method which, in his conception, would make possible the development of the members of this class. It is a formation which, based on the previously explained notion of paidéia, involves the practice of Gymnastics and the teaching of Music. The former aims at developing the capacities of the body, which, besides providing the physiological conditions for other activities, would create the irascible disposition for the practice of its corresponding virtues; that is, it would be through gymnastics that man would perfect his aptitude for courage and spiritedness. The latter, in turn, aims at developing the capacities of the soul, which, through activities devoted to the teaching and practice of rhetoric, poetry, history, theater, music proper, among others, would be enabled to act with gentleness and affability, providing man with the fundamental tools to conduct himself with courtesy, act with benevolence and be guided by magnanimity:
“Have you not observed the effect that gymnastics practiced throughout life has on the mind when devoid of any training in music and poetry, or the opposite effect, that is, music and poetry without gymnastics?” “To what effect are you alluding?” “Savagery and harshness in the one case and softness and gentleness in the other.” “I observe what you point out. You mean that those who devote themselves exclusively to gymnastics end up becoming more savage than is advisable, while those who devote themselves exclusively to music and poetry end up becoming softer than would be desirable.” “Moreover,” I said, “savagery comes from the spirited element of each one's nature; correctly trained, it produces courage, but if it is overworked, the likelihood is that it will produce harshness and cruelty.” “That is my opinion.” “And is it not the philosophical element of nature that produces gentleness? If it is subjected to excessive relaxation, it becomes more pliable than it should be, but if properly worked, it produces gentleness and order.” “So it is.” “Well, we say that our guardians must possess both these natures.” “Indeed, they must.” “And must the two not be harmoniously combined?” “How could they not?” “And once this harmony is achieved, does the soul show itself both moderate and courageous?” “Certainly.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 166–167, 410c–411a)
That is, through a fine harmony in the development of the faculties of body and soul, man would attain a just balance in his way of being, ensuring the appropriate measures of aggressiveness and gentleness so that he would be in a position to act in the most fitting way in all situations, being able to align the wisdom and strength necessary to place himself on the straight path of the Idea of the Good, the supreme symbol of Truth, which will be addressed further on.
In short, it can be said that this class of the city is analogously related to the so-called irascible part of the soul, the one responsible for fury, spirit and fearlessness, capable of impelling man to face difficulties with courage, building within himself an impregnable fortress.
Finally, we come to the class of the rulers, the true guardians, selected from among the best auxiliaries:
“Like those who take colts into noise and tumult in order to see whether they feel fear, we shall have to expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them far more thoroughly than gold is tested by fire, in order to make sure which of them remains immune to this spell and constantly keeps his composure unscathed, showing himself a good guardian of himself and of the culture he has acquired, preserving his rhythm and harmony in all these conditions and the character that would make him supremely useful to himself and to the State. Whoever is tested in this way as a child, a youth and a grown man, and always, after the rigor of the test, comes through well and without blemish, shall be made a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be the object of honors during his life and after his death be revered through the most prestigious funeral rites and other memorials.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 172–173, 413d–414a)
The class of the true guardians or rulers of the State would therefore be formed from the class of the auxiliaries, from which the individuals endowed with the greatest capacity would be selected – not only those technically superior in the mastery of the liberal arts within the scope of paideutic formation, but those who showed a solid moral firmness that would guarantee, in all circumstances, the maintenance of a virtuous character directed toward the good of the State, no matter how tempting or seductive contrary initiatives might appear.
It is the class that must be endowed with the capacity to observe the city as a whole and to have the good discernment to act with the necessary prudence according to each situation that arises. It is the group that sees beyond its position on the social chessboard and reflects on the overall organization of the city. Thus, it is evident that these men must be equipped with the virtues proper to the other classes; however, they must also possess the virtue related to this ability to act in accordance with what is most appropriate, which can only be achieved through the possession of an effective body of knowledge. Thus, the virtue inherent to this class is Wisdom:
“Then,” I said, “is there some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens in the State we have just founded that does not discern or advise on any particular matter, but rather on the State as a whole and on the improvement of relations both internal and with other States?” “Certainly there is.” “And what is it, and who holds it?” “It is that of guardianship, in the hands of those rulers whom we just now called guardians in the full sense of the word.” “And how would you describe the State on account of this knowledge?” “As possessing good judgment and truly wise.”
[…]
“It follows that it is by virtue of its smallest class and smallest part, in which this knowledge is found, that a State established according to nature would be wise as a whole. And to this class, which seems naturally to be that of the few, belongs the share of knowledge which, alone among all other forms of knowledge, should be called wisdom.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 193–194, 428d–429a)
For Plato, this wisdom consists in the contemplation of universals, the only path of access to knowledge. The journey of forming the ruler is therefore analogous to the journey of the prisoner who leaves the cave, as discussed earlier. The formation of the ruler consists of an ascending movement that starts from the particular and seeks the universal, thus leading him to the contemplation of truth, which is supremely good and, consequently, beneficial and desirable. Thus, the ruler who contemplates the truth will always act in the best possible way, guided not by what is personally most convenient for him, but by what is in fact good in itself; he will act, therefore, guided by the supreme Idea of the Good, by which “just things and the others become useful and beneficial” (Platão, 2019).
The Idea of the Good is the “yardstick” by which something can be good; it is the reference, the paradigm, which guarantees knowability and discernment between the better and the worse:
“Therefore, what gives truth to the things known and the cognitive faculty to the knower is the Form (Idea) of the Good. And although it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Knowledge and truth are both beautiful, but the good is distinct from them and surpasses them in beauty.” (Platão, 2019, p. 316, 508e)
The good ruler, in this way, acts inspired by the Supreme Good, which is the source from which all truth radiates. The guardian is thus identified with the one known for his love of wisdom, and must become like him if he wishes to exercise his function with excellence and mastery; the guardian of the city must be a philosopher and vice versa:
“Until philosophers become kings in the States, or those who are now called kings and sovereigns philosophize sincerely and adequately – that is, until political power and philosophy are completely joined, and until the many natures that at present pursue exclusively one or the other are compulsorily barred – States will never be rid of evils, dear Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And until this happens, the form of government we have been theoretically describing will never be realized within the limits of possibility or see the light of the sun.” (Platão, 2019, p. 263, 473c–d)
It is thus understood that the class of rulers will be composed of a small group of men who, acting through the authority that comes from knowledge, will have legitimacy before the other classes. It is the class that makes the decisions concerning the city and that, therefore, prevails over the others; and these others, recognizing the preeminence of the former, will willingly accept submitting to its orders, understanding that they are directed toward the good of the community as a whole.
Relating the class of rulers, analogously, to the structure of the human soul, it can be stated that it corresponds to its rational part. This is the part that has wisdom as its virtue and that, through it, becomes capable of guiding itself, as well as leading the appetitive and irascible parts.
Thus, it is the part of the soul that must be in command of the individual's will and, consequently, of his actions. This part, guided by the Idea of the Good, that is, by the cause and foundation of truth, will proceed with wisdom and, as a result, will conduct itself in the most appropriate, beneficial and desirable way possible within the circumstances that arise.
In this way, the structure of the ideal city as proposed by Plato in his work The Republic has been set out, and the virtues proper to each of its parts have been made evident, the former being precisely the element that will allow the latter to exist and operate correctly and, thus, be able to fulfill what is expected of them within the overall framework of the pólis.
2.3.5 THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE TYPES OF SOUL
Having established the structure of the ideal city, with each of its classes and corresponding virtues, the ideal structure of the human soul was set out by analogy, since the initial premise was accepted that the city is nothing more than the individual soul projected on a large scale. Thus, although the city, in Plato's Republic, was used to speak about the soul, it is evident that the existence of the latter is a priori in relation to the former, since the city needs the soul in order to come to be, given that it would be absurd to speak of a city without citizens. That is, first there is the soul, and only then does the pólis come about.
However, it is important to understand that the project undertaken by Socrates throughout the dialogue consists in knowing the soul in its perfection; that is, it is not that his intention is to propose knowledge free of any chance of fallibility, but that he seeks to analyze the structure of the soul from an ontological perspective. Thus, a definition is first proposed of what the perfect soul would be, that is, of its ideal form, so that, in light of it, the concrete individual souls existing in the various types of men could be examined through correspondence with and/or privation of the properties that constitute the initial concept. That is, it is not because the ideal form of the soul has come to be known – which, it should be noted, is intelligible and therefore impossible to manifest materially in a complete way – that the individually existing souls are in fact close to this perfect structure. It is evident that the formal structure of the soul is always the same, since, in order to be a soul, it must participate, even if minimally, in its ideal form. That is, it must preserve its essence, but, like any other being that manifests itself atomistically, it may be better or worse positioned on its scale of perfection or, in the case of the human soul, it may be more or less ordered.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the ideal city comes from the ideal soul and that this correlation must be unique, since their ideal forms are also unique. Thus, the path that leads to the ideal city can only be one, that is, the one that proceeds from ideal souls. On the other hand, any path other than this can no longer lead to the perfect city. It can be concluded, therefore, that there must be a type of city corresponding to each type of soul, which will determine its way of being. This correlation will be observed in the organization of this city, which will be embodied in its form of government:
“And are you aware that there are necessarily as many human types as there are forms of government? Or do you believe that forms of government are born ‘from oak or rock’ and not from the habits and character of the individuals who dwell in the cities governed by them, who by their weight in the scale, so to speak, drag the rest along with them?” “No. I do not believe they come from any source other than that.” “Then, if there are five forms of State, there must also be five forms of soul of individuals.” (Platão, 2019, p. 369, 544d–e)
That is, the organization of the souls present in the city will determine the way in which it will be governed. Depending on the type of soul, a certain form of government will arise, which, for Plato, can be of five types.
First, there is the aristocratic form of government, which, as its very etymology reveals, is the one in which the best or, rather, the most capable make the decisions. The same logic, therefore, applies to the individual with an aristocratic soul. In him, his best part prevails over the others. Now, it has already been shown that the rational part of the human soul is superior to the parts guided by spirit and concupiscence. Thus, this man will make his decisions using a rational criterion and relying on knowledge of a universal and, therefore, true order. From this process only something beneficial can come, once it is also accepted that truth is, by definition, good and desirable. In this way, the aristocratic soul is, in a certain sense, the one that was proposed as the ideal model throughout the dialogue, bearing within itself the very notion of justice and resting on a premise of wisdom. It should also be noted that, according to the Platonic view, the aristocratic form of government is not bound to have a determined number of men in its leadership; that is, nothing prevents, for example, an aristocracy from having a single man as head of government – as in the case of the philosopher-king – being, so to speak, an aristocratic monarchy, provided that this ruler is in fact the best among men.
Next, the timocratic form of government is examined, that is, the one based on the desire for glory. Clearly, it is related to the soul in which the instinct of spiritedness is disorderly heightened, overcoming the sphere of reason:
“However, this form of government will be afraid to bring wise men to power, on the grounds that they are no longer simple and straightforward, but mixed, and it will incline toward simpler and more spirited individuals, naturally more suited to war than to peace. This government will hold the devices and stratagems of war in high esteem and will spend its time always at war.”
[…]
“You are describing absolutely,” he said, “a form of government that mixes good and evil.” “Yes, indeed, it is mixed, but the predominance of spirit makes only one thing stand out and become evident in it, namely, the love of victory and the love of honors.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 374–375, 547e–548c)
That is, the timocratic soul has a strong inclination to settle its disputes by using force, as well as a great attachment to its status, holding in high regard the image it has of itself. For the timocrat, therefore, what matters most is not the prevalence of truth, but rather the projection and display of his personal glory. It is evident that the timocrat cannot be someone totally devoid of virtue, since virtue is to some extent necessary for the conquest of glory – one may highlight, in this case, the importance of courage – but it is a soul that can no longer be considered just, since it already shows traces of disorder, that is, it is one in which what is objectively higher no longer prevails.
Next comes the oligarchic form of government, in which those with the greatest financial capacity govern, and which is thus also called plutocracy. It corresponds to the soul that is moved by money:
“And what kind of form of government do you mean by oligarchy?” “The one based on assessment by wealth, in which government is in the hands of the rich and from which the poor man is excluded.”
[…]
“And will they not then pass a law characteristic of an oligarchic form of government, which establishes a qualification based on wealth – a higher sum where the government is more oligarchic, a lower one where it is less so – proclaiming that those whose wealth does not reach the established sum are not qualified to take part in government? And either they enforce this law by force of arms or, without resorting to that, they establish their government by spreading terror among the population. Is it not so?” (Platão, 2019, pp. 378–379, 550c–551b)
Thus, the oligarchic man is the one who bases his actions on the monetary gains that can be obtained, as well as using the amount of goods possessed as a criterion for assessing other individuals. Thus, although he may also possess some kind of virtue – if he built his fortune legitimately – he moves even further than the timocrat from the ideal situation set out initially. If the former still aims, to some extent, to do good – which others may enjoy – even if for his individual glorification, the latter has no necessary commitment to what is beneficial, but only to the financial returns which, ultimately, will serve to consolidate his position of dominance even further.
The democratic form of government, in turn, is the one in which the possibility of a hierarchy of values is annihilated; it is the government of opinion. There is no longer an objective differentiation between what is better or worse, but only what is most convenient at a given moment according to the judgment of the majority. It is, indeed, a government that values freedom but, owing to its absence of rules, a corrupted version of it:
“In the first place, are they not free, and is the State not full of freedom and freedom of speech? And does not everyone in it enjoy the freedom to do as he wishes?” “So they say.” “And where this freedom exists, it is evident that each will organize his own life in whatever way pleases him.” “It is evident.” “I suppose it is mainly in a State under this form of government that human beings of all kinds arise.”
[…]
“And it would seem to be a pleasant form of government, anarchic, full of variety, and one that dispenses a kind of equality alike to equals and unequals.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 390–392, 557b–558c)
Thus, the democratic soul is the one that is not guided by rigid and well-defined moral values; it is, in fact, quite shapeless and adaptive. It molds itself according to need in order to defend not some universal principle that transcends it, but only its supposed immediate well-being. In this soul, the notion of better and worse, superior and inferior, disappears; it is the reign of relativism and, therefore, of the emptying of order:
“And he continues his life on these terms, surrendering each day to the appetite of the moment. Sometimes he gets drunk, abandoning himself to the sound of the flute; at other times he drinks only water and diets; sometimes he devotes himself to gymnastics; at other times he stays idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he seems to devote himself to philosophy. He often becomes involved in politics and, leaping from his seat, says and does whatever comes into his head. If his feeling of emulation leans toward soldiers, he will be drawn in that direction; if toward money-makers, he will turn that way. In his existence there is neither order nor necessity, but he calls it pleasant, free and blessed, and clings to it all the years of his life.” “You have perfectly described,” he said, “the life of a man who firmly believes in equality.” (Platão, 2019, p. 397, 561d–e)
Finally, there is the tyrannical form of government, which arises as the fruit of the disorder established by democracy. After a certain time subjected to relativism, the city finds itself in complete anarchy, since it no longer has the values that at some point allowed its prosperity. It falls into decline and its people are not even capable of making an adequate diagnosis, much less of proposing a solution. Under these conditions, the only way out seems to be the delegation of absolute power to a certain individual who appears strong and capable of restoring order; and, evidently, he need not in fact possess any of the qualities essential to accomplish this mission, but must, rather, have the ability to convince the people through inflammatory and demagogic speeches. There then arises an incentive for the man who makes good use of rhetoric, especially one who has no commitment to truth, to rise in the pólis. There is, therefore, a stimulus for men devoid of virtues to occupy positions of leadership, consequently bringing slavery and misfortune to the city:
“And the likelihood is that excessive freedom leads to nothing other than a change to excessive slavery, whether this applies to an individual in his private life or to a State.” “That is the likelihood.” “It is, therefore, also likely that tyranny can only result from democracy and from no other form of government: from the greatest freedom, I suppose, the greatest and cruelest slavery.”
[…]
“And is it not always the regular habit of the people to promote one individual as their champion and special protector, nourishing and aggrandizing him?” (Platão, 2019, pp. 401–405, 564a–565c)
The man with a tyrannical soul, although he may have the illusion of freedom, is the greatest slave of all, since the one who does evil is not free; quite the contrary, he is a slave to his most varied and base passions, which behave as his masters. This man has no self-mastery and is thus going against his rationality. The consequence is that he is the unhappiest individual of all. Trapped in the labyrinth of his impulses and intoxicated by the greed of his desires, he has a distorted view of reality, unable to contemplate it as it presents itself, and is thus deprived of the grace that comes from contemplating order and truth:
“Then, supposing that the man bears a resemblance to the State, would it not be necessary for the same proportion to be found in him too? And would his soul not necessarily be full of slavery and servility, and its noblest elements enslaved, while an inferior element, the most vicious and most insane, acts as its master?” “It must be so.” “Will you say, then, that this soul is a slave or free?” “I would say certainly a slave.” “And is the enslaved and tyrannized State not the least able to do what it really wants?” “Most certainly.” “Consequently, a tyrannized soul – I mean the soul as a whole – will also be the least able to do what it wants and, necessarily, always stung and torn by the stings of a gadfly, will be full of confusion and remorse.” “And how could it be otherwise?” “Is the tyrannically governed State necessarily rich or poor?” “Poor.” “Then a tyrannical soul, too, must necessarily always be poor and insatiable.” “So it is.” “And what about fear? Are not a State and a man in these conditions full of it?” “Most certainly.” “And do you think you will find more lamentations, groans, complaints and anguish in any other State?” “By no means.” “And as regards man, do you think you would come across these things more in another man than in the tyrannical one, who is maddened by his appetites and passions?” “And how could that be?” “Well, it was in view of all these considerations and similar ones, I suppose, that you judged this State to be the most unhappy of States.” “And was I not right?” he replied. “You were. But what do you say about the tyrannical man when you observe these same things?” “That he is by far the unhappiest of all.” (Platão, 2019, pp. 423–425, 577d–578b)
In this way, from the analysis of the forms of government that can be conceived in the city, it was also possible to know the types of human souls. It is further shown that there is an evident hierarchy that organizes these same forms and souls into better and worse. Plato, in discussing all of them, sets out a process that starts from the ideal form, the aristocratic one, and, from its growing corruption, presents the other forms until reaching tyranny, which is singled out as that of maximum degeneration.
It is interesting to note that, throughout this sequence that goes from the ideal to its antagonist, there is an element that is gradually eroded along the way and which, in fact, represents the preponderant factor that will determine the quality of the human soul in question. It is clearly perceived that, throughout this degenerative process, virtue is gradually fading, and its absence, to a greater or lesser degree, ends up acting as the immediate cause of what presents itself. The aristocratic soul, for example, being the most perfect, is the one which, guided by its rational part, which makes use of the virtue of Wisdom, manages to establish within itself its correct order in accordance with its own nature. In this soul, moreover, the virtue of Justice is manifested, which, being, so to speak, the supreme virtue, guarantees that each thing is in its proper place, in the measure appropriate to it. Indeed, if Wisdom and Justice prevail, consequently Courage and Moderation will also be present, making this man the most sublime of all. That is, it can be said that, in the aristocratic soul, virtue is present in its highest degree, a fact embodied in the manifestation of Justice itself.
As one advances through the other types of soul, one observes that virtue becomes increasingly absent. In timocracy, for example, there is no longer Justice, since the rational part of the soul is at times subordinated to the spirited part, which submits to the virtue of Courage. In this context, in order to attain the much-desired glory, this man will make use of an inadequate portion of this virtue, which, consequently, will end up preventing the others from manifesting themselves as they should. In oligarchic and democratic souls, virtue, although it may occasionally manifest itself, is already greatly weakened, and there is difficulty even in its presence in the lowest part of the soul, the concupiscent part. That is, it becomes a challenge for this soul, through Moderation, to master the instincts that make it resemble animals. The tyrannical soul, in turn, is totally subjugated by vice – the inverse of virtue. This soul bears within itself complete disorder and is therefore always subject to its most immediate impulses and passions, no longer having the resources necessary to defend itself from itself. Through the complete absence of virtue, it surrenders to total slavery and thus denies its own humanity.
Finally, it should be emphasized that an interdependence is seen among all these virtues indicated above. The superior ones (Justice and Wisdom) guarantee the inferior ones (Courage and Moderation), and these are necessary in order to reach the former. Thus, it can be stated that one virtue induces another, just as its absence also ends up negating the presence of another, allowing one to conclude that there is an “ascent” and a “descent” on the “staircase of virtue”. That is, the higher man rises, the more chances he has of rising even higher, and vice versa. It falls to this man, then, through the pursuit and practice of virtue – or not – to define for himself which type of soul he wishes to bear.
3. CONCLUSION
The objective set for this work was, by means of a bibliographic review of The Republic, to analyze the model of the ideal city elaborated by Plato and to investigate the relevance of ethical science in the construction of this paradigm.
To this end, an initial summary exposition of the formation and organization of ancient Greece was undertaken. At this stage, the intention was to establish a relationship between the social and cultural context in which the Greeks found themselves and the emergence of the Socratic-Platonic phenomenon. It was shown that, not by chance, Philosophy had its cradle in Greece, owing mainly to its decentralized model of social organization in the so-called poléis, as well as to the cultural atmosphere that prevailed in them, where debates in public squares were a consolidated reality and the idea of freedom was already held in high esteem, contributing greatly to the confrontation of ideas and the consequent refinement of ways of thinking.
Socrates, despite the intellectual revolution he would initiate, representing a break with the naturalist thinkers who would later be called pre-Socratics, is a fruit of this fertile environment and possibly could only flourish because of it, even though he was not fully understood and was even persecuted and condemned to death by his own pólis. Plato, in turn, is a disciple of Socrates and very probably would not have acquired the renown he achieved without his predecessor. Plato “adopts” his master as the protagonist of his dialogues and, already in the phase of his intellectual maturity, writes what is considered his masterpiece, whose title would in the future always be remembered together with its author.
Thus, in this phase of the work, by means of a hermeneutic analysis, it was possible to briefly consider the background and the historical environment in which Plato was situated during the production of his work.
Next, the concept of Ethics in the context of ancient Greece was investigated. The importance that the great poets of Antiquity, especially Homer and Hesiod, attached to the notion of excellence was addressed, as they used their works to highlight, through their various characters, the conduct they considered to be of a morally superior nature. At that time, the term areté was used to refer to what is understood by virtue, that is, the element which, when present in the individual, would necessarily make him good. At this point, this notion of excellence was explored through the exposition and analysis of the great deeds of those who were seen as the mythical heroes of the past. Thus, moral science was determined by and determined the popular imagination, in a self-reinforcing process that was not necessarily in accordance with the conclusions that would later be obtained through the method of philosophical inquiry, but was subordinated to a collective intuition that was, to a great extent, influenced by the cultural and historical context. That is, although there was already an attempt to know the higher aspects existing in man, the results achieved were still far from the production of knowledge proper.
The importance of Pythagoras was also discussed; among other things, he stood out for the relevance he attached to moral rectitude, seeing it even as a necessary requirement for the attainment of knowledge. The philosopher of Samos would, without a doubt, exert great influence on those who came after him.
Next, Socrates was discussed, the philosopher who would effectively give robustness to the ethical debate. He directed his investigation straight at the man of the city and, by means of his dialectical method, began to question the concepts of things as such. At this point, the discussion advances to another level, since it sets itself the task of discovering the universal definitions that structure ethical science, in contrast to the multiplicity presented in the exhortations of the poets and the admonitions of the Pythagoreans.
It should be noted that this in-depth examination of Ethics initiated by Socrates consisted of an investigation of the virtues, with great interest in presenting, at the end of each process, a proposition that would reasonably delimit them, although this was not always possible, at which point one came upon the so-called “aporias”.
Plato, in turn, gave positive form to his master's method and, on the basis of it, developed his own notions concerning moral science. A strong presence of the Socratic element can be noted in his early dialogues, which often seemed more engaged with the form of investigation – dialectic – than with the merits of the question under discussion. Although his most complex works are those produced last – when topics even of a cosmogonic order are addressed – it can be stated that Plato shows the maturation of his personality in the presentation of the dialogue The Republic.
Speaking specifically of this work, although it may give a first impression of being a text devoted specifically to the field of political science, in fact it goes much further. Everything begins with a question about the concept of Justice and the confrontation with the difficulty of arriving at a reliable answer. To advance the discussion, Plato – through his protagonist, Socrates – establishes a premise that will completely change the course of the investigation. The philosopher proposes that the city is composed of and exists by virtue of its citizens. Thus, the essence of the latter would determine the essence of the former. The city is only by virtue of its members and, therefore, cannot be different from what they themselves are. In this way, Plato concludes that the nature of man and of the pólis are of the same order and, thus, that it would be possible to establish a correspondence or analogy between what is said of the one and of the other.
In this way, returning to the initial problem, given the difficulty of investigating the manifestation of the phenomenon of Justice in man – or, rather, in the human soul – and having accepted the premise set out above, Plato sets out to ascertain where and how it arises in the city, imagining that it would be easier to contemplate it in an object of greater extension, always bearing in mind that the conclusion reached could safely be transposed to the object of lesser extension – that is, man.
From there, a philosophical effort begins aimed at elaborating an ideal model of the city which, in the end, will also be nothing more than an ideal model of the human soul. The pólis will therefore be used as an instrument for knowing man in greater depth, and it is evident that the theme of virtue will be a central element in this process.
Next, the notorious Theory of Ideas was addressed, which permeates the whole Platonic imagination and, in the Republic, could not be otherwise. One could say, in fact, that this Theory is presupposed and necessary for the correct interpretation of this dialogue.
The Theory of Ideas represents an attempt to explain the ontological aspect of reality. It is an undertaking that seeks to show how this reality is structured and, thus, how everything that is comes to be manifested. Thus, Plato conceives of the existence of two distinct planes, which he will call the sensible world and the intelligible world. The first represents the world of the senses, of motion, of becoming, where beings manifest themselves in their multiplicity. In this world, the mode of being of things is extremely precarious, since, subject to the constant motion characteristic of this plane, they are all in a permanent process of generation and corruption, of ceasing to be and coming to be. Thus, through the mere apprehension, via the bodily senses, of the manifestation of particular beings, the elaboration of any knowledge becomes impossible, since it always changes and escapes at the very instant it is apprehended. The intelligible world, in turn, is the one accessed through a process of intellection that starts from the apprehension of the sensible world. That is, although it exists in itself, it is “touched” by the human mind only through an effort of intelligence. This world represents being taken in its extreme and complete manifestation, since, being immaterial, it is not subject to change and thus rests in the rigidity and immobility of eternity. This suprasensible reality is not a place properly speaking, but represents the set of possible schemes determined a priori of what is capable of manifesting itself individually and sensibly. That is, it is the world of universals, of essences, of perfect archetypal forms, from which, through a scheme of participation, the beings present in sensible reality are shaped so as to be what they are. This Theory also concerns Platonic epistemology, that is, the way in which man can be said to know something. In short, the individual, immersed in the sensible world, apprehends a particular being through his senses and instantly grasps the universal form present there. In this way, he extracts what is essential and immobile and, only then, is capable of elaborating true knowledge. Thus, according to this proposal, the sensible world would be a kind of imperfect copy of the intelligible world, and everything that manifests itself in the former must necessarily and ideally exist a priori in the latter.
From this Theory it is concluded that, in order to know something, one must turn to the intelligible world, that is, one must seek the essential universality that manifests itself in each thing. This whole analysis is represented in the so-called Allegory of the Cave, which symbolizes the ascending movement made by man from the sensible to the intelligible and, thus, from opinion to truth.
Knowing this Theory is relevant to the investigation undertaken in this work, since it provides the foundations of the enterprise carried out in the elaboration of the ideal city. That is, it makes clear that the effort made throughout the Republic to know the pólis and the soul is nothing more than an attempt to grasp intellectually their archetypal forms. That is – and here lies the great importance of this understanding – the process that takes place throughout the dialogue is in no way propositional, but rather descriptive, that is, based on discoveries reached by means of the dialectical method. Thus, Plato is not proposing a form of government or a model of human being, but is grasping, by means of this method – which is nothing other than the confrontation of hypotheses – what the pólis and the soul in fact are in themselves. Indeed, he is seeking to know what can be known about these forms. In this way, in this process of discovery, the structuring of the ideal city begins.
Plato conceives of the pólis as divided into three classes, each with its respective nature and importance. In the first are the workers, farmers and artisans, responsible for the aspect related to the survival of the city; that is, they are linked to the creation of the material conditions for it to exist and subsist. It is a more rudimentary class, from which no great complexity is expected. The pólis and the human soul having been considered isomorphic, this class would correspond to the part of the soul called concupiscent. Its actualization takes place ideally when it is oriented toward and by the virtue of moderation. Indeed, it is the presence of this attribute that makes this class maximally what it can be, according to its own nature.
In the next class are the auxiliaries of the guardians, that is, the warriors, those responsible for guaranteeing the physical integrity of the city. That is, it is a group that will use force to fulfill its function and, thus, is related to the part of the soul called irascible, responsible for spirit, impetus and boldness, which thus reaches its maximum expression through the presence of the virtue of courage. It is this attribute that allows the member of this class to realize himself fully as such. It should be noted that, although this group is invested with a capacity to act through force, this use is not discretionary. Indeed, it is directed toward the defense of the city and never against its own integrity. To this end, the members of this class undergo a formation that gives them the repertoire to correctly select the opportune moment, conditions and measure that justify their action. They work Gymnastics in the body and Music in the soul, thus composing a class that is, to a great extent, different from the first and from which the members of the highest class will come.
In the third and last class are the guardians, the rulers, those in charge of making decisions that involve the whole city, in whom the highest degree of responsibility rests. These individuals are selected from among the best auxiliaries and contemplate the city as a whole. Their nature consists in knowing what takes place in the other classes and going beyond, so as to understand how the balance between the parts comes about and, thus, to guarantee it. It corresponds to the part of the soul called rational, which is the highest and which reaches its fullness through the presence of the virtue of wisdom. The capacity that comes from the presence of this attribute is what allows the ruler, through a correct interpretation of reality, to decide on what is most appropriate. In short, this class represents, so to speak, the “thinking heads” of the pólis, which, guided by universal principles subordinated to the supreme Idea of the Good, will lead the city with mastery, acting as true philosophers. It should also be noted that the virtue of Justice, which is the great object of analysis of this dialogue, is represented as the perfect harmony among all the parts of the city, ordering the application and operation of the other virtues. That is, it is the element that puts each thing in its proper place, in the correct measure and proportion, at the appropriate moment.
Finally, the possible forms of government were discussed, which represent the way in which the city will be organized, constituting, indeed, a reflection of its own members. The exposition of these forms follows a sequence that goes from the most desirable to the least desirable, in a process that narrates how the degenerative process of the city takes place. The model city is the one organized aristocratically, where the most capable are in its leadership. It is evident that this capacity is not meant in the technical sense, as if being a ruler were an artistic trade – like a techné – but in the sense of being effectively capable of commanding according to the dictates of reason. In this form of government, truth reigns and the Good, in the end, always prevails.
In the timocratic form, there is already a certain disorder, since the balance of aristocracy is undone and the scale tips toward the desire for glory. Thus, it is no longer reason and, consequently, truth that prevail, but rather honor and reputation, opening the way for other, more serious evils to enter the city. Next comes oligarchy, the government of influence, of the sovereignty of money, where rulers are not based on universal principles of order and justice, but on the interest of obtaining benefits for themselves. It is the form of government that prepares democracy, since the mass of citizens, seeing themselves unrepresented in the decision-making process, begin to demand some participation, which, finally, becomes universal. At this moment, chaos is produced, since there is no longer any concern for the well-being of the city as a whole, but each individual acts to satisfy his most personal and immediate desires, whether or not these accord with any moral principle. It is the reign of opinion, of relativism, where what prevails is what is imposed by the majority, which comes to consider itself entitled to rewrite reality, immersed in a deep feeling of arrogance that will, in the end, be its own executioner.
Finally, anarchy having been established through democracy, the solution becomes a government of force that restores order. At this moment, absolute powers are given to an individual who attains the position of ruler not through his virtues, but through his capacity to persuade the masses. The incentive was given for the demagogue to stand out, and that is what he does. He has no scruples. Lying, defaming, deceiving and confusing are some of his tactics. Anything goes to carry out his personal project of power. Thus, when this man comes to be at the head of the city, nothing good can be expected any longer. It is the reign of vice and falsehood, where citizens meet their greatest misfortune.
With all these points clarified, it becomes possible to turn to the initial question of this work. Given that the aristocratic form of government is the representative of the ideal city, it is toward it that any analysis must be directed. What is the influence of virtue on this form of government? It is of the same order as its importance in the constitution of the ideal human soul. Thus, it can even be said that it transcends a possible analysis of this kind, since it is not simply relevant – for, if it were, this aspect would constitute one of its parts – but is, in fact, precisely its cause. The ideal city or, in other words, the perfect archetypal form of the pólis, like the human soul, is only ideal because it is virtuous, because its parts are organized according to virtue. The presence of Moderation, Courage and Wisdom, all united in Justice, is what allows the city to be maximally what it should be and thus to function as a living organism – like the rational soul – fully in accordance with its nature, delivering, as a consequence, the greatest happiness to its members.
In this way, as Plato establishes at the beginning of the dialogue, to speak about the city is to speak about the human soul, since the former is the latter projected in large proportions. Likewise, to speak about their ideal forms is to speak about the virtues, since it is these that allow them to be grasped intellectually as such. It is important to remember that Plato's intention was never to establish a propositional model of the city, but rather to discover its intrinsic nature, its essence, in order, on that basis, to elaborate knowledge that would be reasonable. Thus, the effort made in the Republic delivers, in the end, a model that can be contemplated as a perfect form, which can never manifest itself in its entirety, precisely because it is intelligible. Thus, it falls to man to participate to a greater or lesser extent in this paradigm, without ever touching it completely, always bearing in mind that the degree of this participation will always be of the same order as the presence of virtue in his individual soul.